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COMMENTS 
Judicial Development of the Law of Selective 
Service Reopening 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Military Selective Service Act of 19671 (Act) and the regula-
tions2 issued by the President pursuant to the authority granted him 
by the Act3 comprise the basic statutory and administrative guide-
lines for registrants, local boards, and the courts to follow in dealing 
with matters concerning the draft. However, this statutory scheme is 
so nondescript that it has allowed local boards to engage in abusive 
procedures that have raised serious constitutional issues, especially 
those of procedural and substantive due process. As a result of these 
legislative shortcomings and administrative abuses, the courts have 
been called upon to play an important role in the Selective Service 
System. This role has encompassed more than merely ensuring that 
the substantive and procedural provisions in the regulations and the 
Act are followed. The courts have also served a type of legislative 
function by modifying and adding to the regulations to ensure that 
these regulations, as well as local board activities conducted pursuant 
to them, remain consistent with the policies underlying the Act and 
with the basic notions of fairness inherent in the concept of due pro-
cess. 
The role that the courts have played recently in Selective Service 
matters is effectively illustrated by cases involving the problem of 
reopening a Selective Service classification for consideration of a 
change in a registrant's status that might put him into a new classifi-
cation.4 Typically, although not always, this problem arises in cases 
in which reclassification will be favorable to the registrant since the 
local boards do not seem to have any qualms about reopening to 
classify a registrant I-A (available for military service).6 
The Supreme Court recently considered one aspect of the re-
opening problem in Mulloy v. United States6 and it has dealt with an-
other aspect of that problem this term in Ehlert v. United States.1 
I. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-67 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
2. Selective Serv. Sys., 32 C.F.R. §§ 1600-90 (1971). 
3. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(l) (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968) [hereinafter Act], authorizes the President "to prescribe the necessary rules 
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this title." 
4. The regulations governing the reopening of a registrant's classification are found 
in 32 C.F.R. § 1625 (1971). 
5. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10. See notes 177-97 infra and accompanying text. 
6. 398 U.S. 410 (1970). See notes 137-61 infra and accompanying text. 




While the particular issues involved in Mulloy, Ehlert, and other re-
opening cases may seem rather technical, they are of considerable in-
terest to Selective Service practitioners and, of course, to registrants 
themselves. There are two major reasons for this interest. First, re-
opening problems usually arise in the context of discretionary defer-
ments and exemptions such as hardship and conscientious objection.8 
These classifications have become increasingly significant to those 
seeking exemption from military service since most nondiscretionary 
classifications. such as the deferments for fathers9 and for graduate 
students,10 have either effectively been terminated or are likely to be 
similarly dealt with in the near future-particularly the II-S defer-
ment.11 Second, reopening often presents the only avenue a regis-
trant has for raising a claim for a classification other than I-A. When 
the registrant registers at age eighteen his beliefs as a conscientious 
objector may not yet have crystallized, or the facts and circumstances 
constituting a hardship claim may not yet have arisen. Once the pe-
riod allotted to a registrant to appeal his initial classification has ex-
pired,12 reopening is the only procedure by which he can receive a 
new classification. 
Therefore, in the light of the context in which reopening occurs 
today, it is an important area of the draft law, and, barring abolition 
of the entire draft system, there is likely to be considerable continu-
ing controversy over it. Moreover, aside from the importance of 
this particular aspect of the draft law, a study of the problems of re-
opening is especially relevant to a discussion of the role of the courts 
in the Selective Service System since abuses in this area have been 
among the most scandalous examples of administrative arbitrari-
ness. The purpose of this Comment is to restate the law of reopen-
ing as developed by the Act, the regulations, and the courts. The 
discussion will necessarily include a look at the abuses committed 
8. A brief look at the cases in the Selective Service Law Reporter that deal with 
reopening will show this to be the case. The Selective Service Law Reporter began 
publication in April 1968 and includes all subsequently reported draft cases, as well 
as a number of otherwise unreported draft cases. 
9. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30(c) (1971) eliminates fatherhood deferments as of April 23, 
1970. However, those registrants previously deferred because of fatherhood will continue 
to be deferred so long as they "continue to maintain a bona fide family relationship 
in their home." 
IO. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.26(a) (1971) provides that graduate deferments are restricted 
to "any registrant who is satisfactorily pursuing a course of graduate study in medicine, 
dentistry, veterinary medicine, osteopathy, optometry or podiatry, or in such other 
subjects necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest." 
11. See note 37 infra. President Nixon has indicated his intention to eliminate 
undergraduate student deferments if Congress empowers him to do so. See 2 SEL. Smv. 
L. REP. NEWSLETTER 59 (1970). The Act currently requires the President to provide for 
undergraduate student deferments. 50 U.S.C. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). The 
student deferment is found at 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 (1971). 
12. A registrant has the right to appeal within thirty days any classification given 
him by his local board. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.2(c) (1971). 
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by local boards, the judicial reaction to these improprieties, and the 
availability of judicial review in various reopening situations, as 
well as comments on the various aspects of the substantive law of re-
opening. 
I!. BASICS OF REOPENING 
A. Reopening Defined and Introduced 
Selective Service regulations state explicitly, "No classification is 
permanent."13 When new facts or conditions arise that affect a reg-
istrant's status and thus justify a change in his classification, reopen-
ing is the only vehicle available for the realization of that change.14 
The reopening process consists of two separate steps that local boards, 
registrants, and courts often fail to distinguish.15 Because of the vary-
ing procedural consequences that fl.ow from each of these two steps, 
it is important that each remains clearly denoted. The first, the deci-
sion whether to reopen, involves a determination by the local board 
members, or, in appropriate situations, by the state or local director,16 
whether the new facts submitted to them or those reasonably to be 
implied from the information submitted justify taking the second 
step, the actual reclassification decision.17 It is quite possible that in 
some situations the facts communicated to the local board could not, 
under any reasonable circumstances, be sufficient to warrant reclas-
sification of the registrant, even if they subsequently were proved 
true. For example, a registrant classified I-A may write his board, 
inform it that he is enrolled in law school, and ask that his classifi-
cation be reopened for consideration of a student deferment. Since 
student deferments are no longer granted to most graduate students 
under current regulations,18 the board would properly refuse to re-
open. In such a situation there is no need or purpose in proceeding 
any further, and, after proper notice from the local board inform-
ing the registrant of its action, 19 the reopening process is termi-
13. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.l(a) (1971). 
14. See text accompanying note 12 supra. 
15. See, e.g., United States v. Norman, 412 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1969). In Norman the 
local board failed to consider whether reopening could be had on the basis of new 
facts submitted by a registrant. The board was apparently unaware that consideration 
of whether reopening is proper constitutes a mandatory step under 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 
(1971), as interpreted by the courts, while the act of reopening itself usually constitutes 
a discretionary step under 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). See notes 73-83 infra and accom-
panying text. This mistake may have been attributable to the board's failure to realize 
that reopening consists of two separate steps. The differences between these steps are 
spelled out more fully at notes 17-27 infra and accompanying text. 
16. See notes 34-36 infra and accompanying text. 
17. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1971). 
18. See note 10 supra. 
19. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1971) provides in part: "In such a case [refusal to reopen], 
the local board, by letter, shall advise the person filing the request that the informa-
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nated.20 Thus, while this first step in the reopening process is a 
preliminary one, it nevertheless plays an important screening role 
by weeding out patently invalid claims. 
However, if the facts and circumstances brought to the attention 
of the board or the State or National Director would qualify the 
registrant for a new classification if subsequently found to be true, 
the registrant is said to have presented a prima facie case.21 Once 
presented with a prima facie case, the local board, either on its own 
motion or at the direction of the State or National Director, will 
normally proceed to the second step of the reopening process-the 
actual reclassification decision.22 In making this decision the board 
undertakes determination of the truth of the facts and evaluates the 
over-all merits of the claim.23 This inquiry may involve, among other 
things, attempts to verify information, or merely a weighing of the 
sincerity of the registrant's feelings and beliefs if he is seeking a 
conscientious objector classification.24 Should the board find the 
registrant's claim meritorious, it will grant him a new classifi-
cation. But should the claim fail to meet the board's approval, the 
new classification will be denied and the registrant will keep his 
. initial classification. 
tion submitted does not warrant the reopening of the registrant's classification •••• " 
Generally, the failure to give notice will not provide a registrant with a defense in a 
criminal prosecution or a basis for a writ of habeas corpus unless he has been prejudiced 
in some way by the failure to receive proper notice. See Battiste v. United States, 
409 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1969); Chaney v. United States, 406 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1969); 
United States v. Smogor, 411 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1969); Yeoman v. United States, 400 
F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966), afjd. on 
1'emand, 266 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
959 (1967); United States v. Beaver, 309 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
951 (1963); Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Jones, 
263 F. Supp. 943 (M.D. Ga. 1967), afjd., 387 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1968). But see Stain v. 
United States, 235 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1956). However, the failure to send notice of a 
denial of reopening may be a defense to an indictment charging that a registrant 
knowingly and wilfully failed to report for induction, when it is shown that the 
registrant was awaiting an answer to his request for reopening. United States v. Rabb, 
394 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1968). 
20. The regulations afford the right of appeal from a refusal to reclassify a regis-
trant after reopening has occurred, but they afford no right of appeal from a decision 
denying reopening. See 32 C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1971). 
21. See, e.g., Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 415 (1970); Miller v. United 
States, 388 F.2d 973, 975-76 (9th Cir. 1967). The prima facie case is considered in more 
detail at notes 137-76 infra and accompanying text. 
22. Failure to reopen upon presentation of a prima facie case is deemed an abuse 
of discretion and a denial of due process. Mulloy v. United Staes, 398 U.S. 410, 415-16 
(1970). See notes 137-61 infra and accompanying text. 
23. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.11 (1971) provides: "When the local board reopens the regis• 
trant's classification, it shall consider the new information which it has received .••• " 
24. Previously, in cases in which a claim of conscientious objection was raised, 
boards were also authorized to grant the registrant a pre-classification interview. Selec-
tive Serv. Local Bd. Memorandum No. 41, paras. 2, 3(a), and 3(b), Nov. 30, 1951 (re-
scinded Aug. 27, 1970). See also B. Silard, Some Comments on the Local Board Mem-
orandum No. -fl Pre-Classification Interview, 2 SEL. SERv. L REP. 4001 (1969). 
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The procedural consequences resulting from each step in the re-
opening process are significant.25 On the one hand, if the board re-
fuses to reopen-that is, declines to engage in an evaluative 
determination of the merits of the claim-because it feels that the 
registrant has failed to present a prima facie case, no administrative 
recourse is available to the registrant since neither the Act nor the 
regulations afford a right of appeal within the Selective Service Sys-
tem from the refusal to reopen.26 If the registrant still feels that his 
claim is meritorious, he must look to the courts for further review.27 
On the other hand, once the board determines that reopening is 
proper and actually reopens the registrant's classification and en-
gages in reclassification, the resulting procedural consequences are 
much more significant than when reopening is refused. Reopening 
cancels any work or induction order that previously has been is-
sued.28 Moreover, "[c]rucial to the concept of 'reopening' is 'classi-
fication anew.' "29 Thus, when the board reopens and either retains 
the registrant in the same classification or awards him a new one, 
the classification retained or awarded is considered, in effect, a new 
and initial classification.30 As a result, the registrant acquires the 
right to a personal appearance before the local board and also the 
right to a subsequent appeal before an appellate board if he should 
still object to his classification.31 The regulations also charge the 
local boards with the duty of informing the registrant of the proce-
dural avenues thus made available to him.32 Therefore the decision 
25. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.11 (1971) provides that once the board decides to reopen, the 
registrant is classified as if he had never before been classified. Thus, the normal 
classification procedure provided for in 32 C.F.R. § 1623 (1971) is followed in classifying 
the registrant anew. 
26. See note 20 supra. 
27. For a discussion of the availability of judicial review of local board actions, see 
notes 47-72 infra and accompanying text. 
28. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.14 (1971). However, this section further provides that "if the 
registrant has failed to comply with either of those orders, the reopening of his classifi-
cation thereafter by the local board for the purpose of placing him in Class IV-C or 
Class V-A shall not cancel the order with which he has failed to comply." Class IV-C 
is reserved for aliens not admitted to the United States for permanent residence and 
who have not resided in the United States for one year. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.42 (1971). 
Class V-A is reserved for registrants who have reached their twenty-sixth birthdays. 
32 C.F.R. § 1622.50 (1971). Furthermore, there appears to be a split among the courts 
on the issue whether reopening by the local board after the registrant has refused 
induction and has been indicted will have the effect of cancelling the outstanding 
induction order and thus the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Noonan, 3 SEL. 
SERv. L. REP. 3519 (3d Cir. 1970) (a reopening or a procedural error after the registrant 
has refused induction will not be a proper defense in an ensuing prosecution). Contra, 
United States v. Nordlof, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3546 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. 
Lloyd, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3171 (9th Cir. 1970). 
29. SEL. SERV. L. REP. PRACTICE MANUAL 1f 1095, at 1071 (1968). 
30. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.11 (1971). 
31. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1971). 
32. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (1971). This section refers to the notice provisions of 32 
May 1971] Comments 1079 
of the local board in the first step of the process-whether or not to 
reopen-is a matter of great procedural significance to the registrant 
since a decision to reopen, whether or not a new classification is 
awarded, has the result of cancelling any existing work or induction 
orders as well as vesting the registrant with the right to a personal 
appearance and appeal. 
B. Methods of Obtaining Reopening 
The regulations authorize reopening by the local board in three 
basic situations.33 In two of these situations, the board has no discre-
tion and must reopen; in the third situation, the board has discre-
tion and reopening is nonmandatory. As discussed below, it has been 
this nonmandatory, or discretionary, situation that has generated the 
greatest body of litigation and from which the major judicial devel-
opments in the law of reopening have evolved. 
The first nondiscretionary reopening situation arises when either 
the State Director or the National Director of Selective Service, act-
ing upon a request made directly to him by the registrant, submits 
a written request to the local board to reopen the registrant's classi-
fication.34 When such a request is made, the local board must re-
open. Viewing reopening as a two-step procedure, deciding first 
whether to reopen and then whether to reclassify, the State Director 
or National Director in effect is substituted for the local board by 
taking the first step, that is, by deciding to reopen the registrant's 
classification. This decision then is binding upon the local board. 
However, the evaluation of the over-all merits of the claim, the ac-
tual reclassification decision, still falls into the hands of the local 
board.35 Furthermore, a director's request for reopening automati-
cally cancels any outstanding induction or work order.36 
C.F.R. § 1623.4 (1971), which specify the notice requirements after a registrant has been 
classified. 
33. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 
295 (1970), there were four situations in which reopening was available. Under 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1642 (1970) a registrant declared delinquent for failing to perform any duty required 
under the Selective Service law was to be reclassified I-A, I-A-O, or I-O and then called 
for induction before any other registrants. Reclassifying the registrant from one classifi-
cation to I-A, I-A-O, or I-O was considered a reopening which required that a personal 
appearance and appeal be allowed. 32 C.F.R. § 1642.14 (1970). However, a registrant 
already classified I-A, I-A-O, or I-O before being declared a delinquent was allowed no 
appeal because he had not been reclassified but merely put at the top of the order of 
call. See J. GRIFFITHS, THE DRAFT I.Aw, A "College Outline" for the Selective Service 
Act & Regulations 61 (2d ed. 1968). In Gutknecht the Court struck down § 1642 as 
unauthorized by and in conflict with the Act, and thus ended reopening by this method. 
34. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(a) (1971). 
35. The availability of reopening through a request by the State or National 
Director can be of considerable significance to a registrant confronted with a hostile 
local board. If the board refuses to reopen, the registrant can turn to the State or 
National Director and attempt to obtain reopening through him. See, e.g., Miller v. 
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The second nondiscretionary reopening situation occurs when 
the local board receives facts establishing that a registrant who 
has previously been ordered to report for induction should be 
granted the limited student deferment conferred by classification 
I-S(C).37 The board must reopen the classification and consider anew 
the registrant's classification, thereby cancelling the outstanding or-
der to report for induction.38 In this situation, then, the regulations 
clearly state that the board must make the decision to reopen. 
The final reopening situation authorized by the regulations is 
characterized by the discretion vested in the local board to decide 
whether to reopen. Two methods are provided to authorize reopen-
ing. 89 First, the local board may reopen a registrant's classification 
United States, 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967). While it will be the same hostile board 
that will pass on the validity of the claim, the right of appeal following reopening 
will ensure that some body, in addition to the local board, has the opportunity to 
review the facts and circumstances presented in favor of a new classification. Further-
more, 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971) renders a board powerless to reopen, absent an in-
voluntary change in circumstances, once an induction order has been mailed to the 
registrant. However, in Miller, the court held that the State or National Director may 
empower the board to reopen in a post-induction order situation, notwithstanding 32 
C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 388 F.2d at 976. Thus, a registrant who seeks a new classifica-
tion after he has received an induction order will have to proceed through the State or 
National Director unless he has undergone an involuntary change in status or is seek-
ing the 1-S(C) classification, which is discussed at notes 37-38 infra and accompanying 
text. 
36. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(a) (1971). 
37. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(b) (1971). Classification I-S(C) is reserved for college students 
not qualified for classification in Class 11-S (undergraduate deferment-32 C.F.R. 
§ 1622.26(b) (1971)) and provides those students with a defP.rment until the end of the 
academic year. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15(b) (1971). 
38. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.14 (1971). Normally the local board lacks the power to reopen 
once it has mailed an order to report for induction or civilian work unless it first finds 
an involuntary change in the registrant's status that has occurred since the mailing 
of that order. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). Thus, the mandatory cancellation of the order 
to report for induction upon a showing by the registrant that he is qualified for Class 
1-S(C) can be of considerable significance to a registrant approaching age twenty-six. 
If the board grants the registrant a 1-S(C) classification upon verifying his claim, and if 
the registrant reaches age twenty-six between the time his first induction order is sent 
to him and the time the I-S(C) terminates, his susceptibility to the draft will be re-
duced. This is so because 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7(d)(7) (1971) provides that registrants who 
have not received an induction order before reaching age twenty-six will be placed 
in a lower priority. Thus, a registrant who reaches age twenty-six without being ordered 
to report for induction will have his vulnerability to the draft reduced. 
39. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971) provides: 
The local board may reopen and consider anew the classification of a registrant 
(a) upon the written request of the registrant, the government appeal agent, any 
person who claims to be a dependent of the registrant, or any person who has on 
file a written requeset for the current deferment of the registrant in a case 
involving occupational deferment, if such request is accompanied by written in-
formation presenting facts not considered when the registrant was classified, which, 
if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classification; or (b) upon its own 
motion if such action is based upon facts not considered when the registrant was 
classified which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classification: 
provided, in either event, the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened 
after the local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induc-
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upon written request.40 This request does not necessarily have to 
emanate from the registrant. The registrant, the government appeal 
agent, any person claiming to be a dependent of the registrant, or 
any person who seeks an occupational deferment on behalf of the 
registrant may request reopening if he presents new facts and cir-
cumstances that would justify a new classification if proved true.41 
Second, the board may reopen upon its own motion when it becomes 
aware of facts not previously considered when the registrant was 
classified initially.42 Thus, if new facts and circumstances reach the 
board unaccompanied by a written request, the board may itself 
take the initiative and reopen.43 
In the two discretionary situations outlined above, it should be 
noted that the regulations state that the board may reopen. Neither 
the Act nor the regulations compel the board to reopen, and ostensi-
bly the board is left in command of the situation with vast discre-
tion vested in it. There is only one nonjudicial limit on the board's 
use of that discretion-the board may not reopen, either upon re-
quest or upon its own initiative, after an induction or work order 
has been mailed unless there is a :finding that "there has been a 
change in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over 
which the registrant had no control."44 It should be emphasized, 
however, that this restriction merely prevents the board from re-
opening when a work or induction order has been mailed; it does 
not force reopening. 
In summary, the regulations allow the local boards to wield 
nearly complete control over the reopening process except when the 
State or National Director requests reopening or when the board is 
faced with a I-S(C) situation. Entrusting this discretion to the boards 
has resulted in widespread abuses of reopening by the boards.45 For 
tion ••. or an Order to Report for Civilian Work and Statement of Employer ••• 
unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a change in the regis-
trant's status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control. 
40. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
41. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
42. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). It should be noted that these "facts not considered" 
previously do not necessarily have to be new facts. A board may reopen upon its own 
motion "whenever it appears that it erred in failing to consider all material facts 
available" when it originally classified the registrant. Bradshaw v. United States, 242 
F.2d 180, 186 (10th Cir. 1957). 
43. Although a registrant has no obligation to request reopening, 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1625.I(b) (1971) provides that the registrant has an affirmative duty to report "within 
IO days after it occurs ••• any fact that might result in the registrant being placed in a 
different classification." For a discussion of whether the failure to report any changes 
in status within the specified ten-day limit will result in a waiver of the right to obtain 
reopening, see note 262 infra. 
44. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
45. See the discussion beginning at note 73 infra and accompanying text. These 
abuses have had at least the tacit support of the ex-National Director. General Hershey's 
application of the delinquency regulations (see note 33 supra) illustrates his role in 
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example, boards often fail to consider new facts submitted by regis-
trants, evaluate claims without reopening first-thereby denying a 
registrant the right to appeal-and occasionally reopen classifications 
to the detriment of a registrant without a prior finding of new 
facts.46 In response to challenges to these abuses, many courts have 
developed a number of rules and doctrines that substantially modify 
the regulations and also curb the exercise of discretion by the local 
boards. After a brief consideration of the availability of judicial re-
view of local board activities and procedures, the discussion will 
focus on these rules and doctrines, as well as on other developments 
in the law of reopening. 
C. Judicial Review of Reopening 
A registrant who believes that the Selective Service System has 
treated him unfairly is entitled to judicial review of the propriety 
of the procedures employed and the classification awarded him by 
his board.47 Several different methods of obtaining judicial review 
are available to the registrant. First, if the registrant decides to re-
fuse induction, he may raise his claim as a defense to a criminal 
prosecution for draft evasion.48 The basis of such a defense would 
be that the error committed by the local board invalidates his in-
duction order. Second, the registrant has the option of submitting 
promoting local board excesses. His Local Board Memorandum 85 (April 19, 1968) and 
the cover letter that accompanied it suggested that local boards reclassify students who 
took part in demonstrations against draft boards or in other anti-war protests that the 
local board believed to be illegal. See National Student Assn. v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 
(D.C. Cir. 1969). However, after the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
invalidated a portion of the memorandum, General Hershey persistently refused to 
notify local boards, although he did notify boards of the favorable part of the district 
court decision in the same case. See Hershey Directive Declared Invalid in Part, 2 
SEL. SERV. L. REP. NEWSLEITER 5 (1969); Congressman Notified State Directors of N.S.A. 
v. Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV, L. REP. NEWSLEITER 13, 16 (1969); California Local Boards Not 
Aware of N.S.A. v. Hershey, 2 SEL. SERV. L. REP. NEWSLETI'ER 25, 28 (1969). Subsequent 
to these events the Supreme Court invalidated the delinquency regulations in Gutknecht 
v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970). See note 33 supra. 
46. See discussion beginning at note 177 infra and accompanying text. 
47. See generally Tigar, Judicial Review of Selective Service Decisions, in SELECTIVE 
SERVICE: THE ATIORNEY's VIEW 81 (B. Poindexter ed. 1969); Donahue, The Supreme 
Court vs. Section IO(bX3) of the Selective Service Act: A Study in Ducking Constitu-
tional Issues, 17 UCLA L. REv. 908 (1970); Leonard & Frantz, Judicial Review of Selec-
tive Service Orders, 26 THE GUII.D PRACTITIONER 85 (1967); O'Neil, Review of Selective 
Service Reclassifications, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 536 (1969); Winick, Direct Judicial 
Review of the Actions of the Selective Service System, 69 MICH. L. REv. 55 (1970). 
48. E.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). However, Estep and Falbo v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944), held that no method of judicial review of local board 
action was available to registrants who had failed to exhaust their administrative 
remedies. The exhaustion requirement was recently relaxed somewhat in McKart v. 
United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). 
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to induction and then petitioning for habeas corpus, again claim-
ing that his induction order is invalid.49 
While habeas corpus and defense to a criminal prosecution are 
nearly always available as avenues for judicial review, they are sel-
dom desirable. If the registrant petitions for habeas corpus after 
submitting to induction, he may, for some period of time, needlessly 
be faced with serving the military obligation he is seeking to avoid, 
as well as the possible hostility of his superiors.50 The registrant may 
compromise his religious, ethical, and moral convictions merely by 
submitting to induction. On the other hand, if the registrant decides 
to refuse induction, the "cost" of raising his claim will be the ex-
posure to criminal prosecution and accompanying sanctions, 51 as 
well as the social stigma attaching to such a refusal. 52 Thus, it is ap-
parent that neither habeas corpus nor defending against a criminal 
prosecution are satisfactory methods of raising a claim in the courts. 
A third method, preinduction judicial review, is often available 
to the registrant. ·when such review is available, the registrant may 
sue in a federal district court, prior to his induction, to challenge 
the legality of the induction.53 From the registrant's standpoint, pre-
induction review clearly is the preferable procedure for raising a 
claim since the registrant is able to avoid the hardships and difficul-
ties of habeas corpus or a defense to criminal prosecution. However, 
preinduction judicial review is often unavailable. Indeed, in enact-
ing section 460(b)(3) (commonly referred to as section IO(b)(3)) of 
the l\!ilitary Selective Service Act of 1967,54 Congress clearly ex-
pressed its intent that preinduction judicial review "of the classifica-
tion or processing of any registrant" be made unavailable.55 
49. E.g., Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 
5·12 (1944). 
50. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 129 (1946), Justice Murphy noted that 
the habeas corpus approach to judicial review 
requires one first to enter the armed forces and drop every vestige of civil rights. 
Military orders become the law of life and violations are met with summary court-
martial procedure. No more drastic condition precedent to judicial review has ever 
been framed. Many persons with religious or conscientious scruples are unable to 
meet such a condition. 
51. The maximum penalty for a conviction of refusal to submit to induction may 
be five years imprisonment, a fine of $10,000, or both. Military Selective Service Act of 
1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
52. See, e.g., Donahue, supra note 47, at 956; Note, Admission to the Bar Following 
Conviction for Refusal of Induction, 78 YALE L.J. 1352 (1969). 
53. E.g., Nestor v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 
237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956); Tomlinson v. Hershey, 95 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa. 1949). 
54. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 541-67 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-
73 (1964). 
55. Section I0(b)(3) provides: 
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any regis-
trant br local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a defense to a 
crimina prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title • • • after the regis-
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The Supreme Court, however, in Oestereich v. Selective Service 
Local Board Number 1156 and Clark v. Gabriel51 construed section 
IO(b) (3) as not precluding all preinduction judicial review and in ef-
fect carved out a narrow exception that permits a limited sphere of 
preinduction review. In Oestereich, a divinity student was reclassified 
from IV-D58 to I-A and was ordered to report for induction after he 
refused to carry a draft card. He was subsequently declared a delin-
quent. The Court held that the local board's reclassification of 
Oestereich was "basically lawless" because the Act gives divinity stu-
dents a "plain and unequivocal" right to the IV-D exemption and 
because that right cannot be lost by "activities unrelated to the mer-
its of granting or continuing that exemption."159 Thus, notwithstand-
ing section 10(b)(3), the Court held that preinduction judicial 
review was available to a registrant when there is "a clear departure 
by the Board from its statutory mandate"60 and when this departure 
involves "no exercise of discretion by a Board in evaluating evidence 
and in determining whether a claimed exemption is deserved."61 
· In Gabriel, the Court held that section IO(b)(3) precluded pre-
induction judicial review of a local board's refusal to grant a regis-
trant an exemption as a conscientious objector.62 The Act conditions 
the right to the conscientious objector exemption upon the local 
board's determination that the claim is meritorious.63 Accordingly, 
the Court held that this determination "inescapably involves a de-
termination of fact and an exercise of judgment."64 Thus, the Court 
viewed the board's refusal to grant the exemption as merely an ex-
ercise of the discretion granted to the board by the Act and that re-
fusal could not properly be termed as being "basically lawless." In 
effect, then, in Oestereich the board acted "without statutory basis"65 
trant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to report for 
induction, or for civilian work in the case of a registrant determined to be opposed 
to participation in the war in any form: Provided, That such review shall go to 
the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal boards, 
and the President only when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned 
to such registrant. 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 1(8)(c) [amending Universal Military Training 
and Service Act § 10(b)(3)], codified in 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
56. 393 U.S. 233 (1968). 
57. 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per curiam). 
58. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(g) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43 (1971). 
59. 393 U.S. at 237. 
60. 393 U.S. at 238. 
61. 393 U.S. at 238. 
62. See text accompanying note 256 infra. 
63. 50 U.S.C, App. § 4560) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
64. 393 U.S. at 258. 
65. 393 U.S. at 258. 
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while in Gabriel the activity depended "upon an act of judgment 
by the board.''66 
One commentator, in attempting to define the Oestereich-Gabriel 
exception, has concluded that 
Read together, Oestereich and Gabriel establish a construction of 
section IO(b)(3) that allows preinduction judicial review in cases in 
which the local board's action violates the statute, but prohibits such 
review in cases in which the board acts within its statutory authority 
with respect to a discretionary classification, when such classification 
involves the exercise of board judgment in determining facts and 
evaluating evidence.67 
The reason advanced by the Court for the preclusion of preinduc-
tion judicial review of the local board's fact-finding functions and 
its use of discretion is that such review inevitably will result in the 
very "litigious interruption" that Congress clearly has intended to 
avoid. 68 On the other hand, the Court felt that preinduction judicial 
review of "basically lawless" activity has the tendency to yield sig-
nificantly less disruption.69 
The holdings in Oestereich and Gabriel deal only with the nar-
row issue of preinduction judicial review of local board classifica-
tion decisions.70 However, several lower courts have extended the 
reasoning of these cases to preinduction suits by registrants claiming 
violations of board procedures spelled out in the Act and regula-
tions.71 Thus, when a local board omits or incorrectly employs a 
mandatory procedure involving no exercise of discretion or finding 
66. 393 U.S. at 258. 
67. Winick, supra note 47, at 71. For another interpretation of the Oestereich line 
of cases, see Donahue, supra note 47. 
68. 393 U.S. at 258-59. The legislative history seems to indicate that Congress 
intended to preclude all judicial review, even of basically lawless activity. The Senate 
Report notes that it "attaches much importance to the finality provision and re-
emphasizes the original intent that judicial review of classifications should not occur 
until after the registrant's administrative remedies have been exhausted and the regis-
trant presents himself for induction." S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1967). 
However, in Oestereich the Court noted that it is doubtful "that § IO(b)(3) can sustain 
a literal reading." 393 U.S. at 238. 
69. 393 U.S. at 258-59. The concern of the courts for the efficient processing of 
registrants has its roots deep in history. See, e.g., Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 
(1944); Selective Service Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). 
70. The courts have consistently held that they will not review the correctness of 
Selective Service classification decisions if they are supported by a "basis in fact." Estep 
v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 (1946). The "basis in fact" rule was written into the 
Selective Service law in 1967. See note 55 supra. 
71. E.g., Keibler v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 170, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3294 
(N.D.N.Y. 1970); Rich v. Hershey, 303 F. Supp. 177 (D. Colo.), afjd., 408 F.2d 944 (10th 
Cir. 1969); Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038, motion to dismiss denied sub nom. 
Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969); Wiener v. Local Bd. No. 4, 302 F. 
Supp. 266 (D. Del. 1969). See also notes 162-66 infra and accompanying text. 
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of facts, that action again becomes "basically lawless" and susceptible 
to preinduction judicial review.72 It is the availability of preinduc-
tion judicial review to registrants asserting various procedural er-
rors by their local boards in the administration of the reopening 
process-as well as the implications of such review-that necessitates 
a consideration in this Comment of the problems of preinduction 
judicial review. As each reopening abuse is considered, an attempt 
will be made to determine whether or not that particular error in 
applying the regulations, as they have been interpreted by the courts, 
should entitle a registrant to judicial review prior to his induction. 
III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF A LAW OF REOPENING 
A. Checks on Local Board Discretion and A buses 
I. Failure To Consider a Request 
As noted above, 73 the first step in the reopening process consists 
of determining whether the facts and circumstances under consider-
ation justify actual reopening of the registrant's classification for the 
purpose of making an evaluative determination of the merits of his 
claim. However, some local boards often omit this first step; that is, 
they completely fail to consider whether reopening is proper by ig-
noring the information contained in express requests for reopening 
that registrants have sent to them. For example, in United States v. 
Norman,74 the registrant, classified as a conscientious objector, sub-
mitted information to his board in a request for reopening that in-
dicated his eligibility for a ministerial exemption. The local board, 
however, failed to act upon his request for reclassification or to make 
a determination whether or not reopening was available. In revers-
ing the registrant's conviction for refusal to obey a work order, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that the board's fail-
ure to act was ". . . contrary to the language and spirit of the . . . 
regulations. A duty rests upon the Board, when it receives any writ-
ten request to reopen a registrant's classification, to either reopen or 
refuse to do so."75 
It should be noted that although the Ninth Circuit held that the 
"language" of the regulation compels a consideration of new facts 
submitted, in fact, the regulations remain silent on the matter, and 
72. See, e.g., Murray v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038, motion to dismiss denied sub 
nom. Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.!. 1969). In Murray, the court held, 
inter alia, that it had jurisdiction to hear a preinduction suit because of the local 
board's failure to vote on the registrant's request for reopening as required by 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1604.52a(d) (1971). This failure, the court noted, amounted to "regulatory lawless-
ness." 307 F. Supp. at 1058. 
73. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text. 
74. 412 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1969). 
75. 412 F .2d at 631. 
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merely state that the board "may" reopen upon a request that con-
tains new information.76 While section 1625.4 spells out a procedure 
the board should follow if it does consider the request, that regula-
tion is also silent on the question whether the board must consider 
the new information. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's decision seems to 
rest on the "spirit" of the regulations rather than on a literal inter-
pretation of their language. 
Whatever the reasoning behind decisions such as Norman, courts 
have held unanimously that a local board must at least take the first 
step in the reopening process by considering new facts and circum-
stances submitted to it to determine whether they support a decision 
to reopen.77 Of course, before this duty arises, the registrant must 
submit a valid request for reopening.78 Once faced with a proper 
request, however, the board must take the initial step in the reopen-
ing process, and the courts have consistently labelled its failure to 
do so as a denial of due process.79 Indeed, several courts have even 
held that a registrant is denied due process when a local board for-
wards new facts to an appeal board-which is already hearing an 
appeal on other grounds-without first considering whether reopen-
ing is proper.80 The decisions in these cases are premised on the 
76, 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971) provides: "The local board may reopen and consider 
anew the classification of a registrant •••• " 
77. See, e.g., Battiste v. United States, 409 F.2d 910 (5th Cir, 1969); United States 
v. Smogor, 411 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1969); Mizrahi v. United States, 409 F.2d 1219 (9th 
Cir. 1969); United States v. Norman, 412 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1969); United States v. 
Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966), afjd. on remand, 266 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 
379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967); United States v. Ransom, 223 
F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1955); United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 
1953); Davis v. United States, 199 F.2d 689 (6th Cir. 1952); United States v. Zieber, 161 
F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 827 (1948); United States ex rel. La Charity 
v. Commanding Officer, 142 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1944); Helden v. Laird, 306 F. Supp. 
1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Seeley, 301 F. Supp. 811 (D.R.!. 1969); United 
States v. Shaifer, 311 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. McNeal, 1 SEL. SERV. 
L. REP. 3227 (N.D. Cal. 1968); United States v. Smith, 291 F. Supp. 63 (D.N.H. 1968); 
United States v. Simms, 285 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1968); United States v. Blaisdell, 294 
F. Supp. 1303 (D. Me. 1968); United States v. Singleton, 282 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); 
United States v. Walsh, 279 F. Supp. 115 (D. Mass. 1968); United States v. Longworth, 
269 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio 1967); United States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 
1966); United States v. Brown, 129 F. Supp. 237 (D.N.J. 1955); United States v. Sage, 
ll8 F. Supp. 33 (D. Neb. 1954). 
78. See notes 85-ll5 infra and accompanying text. 
79. See cases cited in note 77 supra. In Davis v. United States, 199 F.2d 689, 691 (6th 
Cir. 1952), the court stated in dictum: "If a local board refuses to consider new informa-
tion offered by the registrant at the time of his personal appearance or refuses to 
receive new information which the registrant endeavors to offer, 1!e is thereby denied 
due process of law." The Davis court cited United States v. Zieber, 161 F.2d 90 (3d 
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 827 (1948), for this proposition. 
80. United States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953); United States 
v. Zieber, 161 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 827 (1948); United States v. 
Sage, 118 F. Supp. 33 (D. Neb. 1954). In Berman, the registrant, classified I-S(C), was 
reclassified I-A and ordered to report immediately for induction. Within ten days he 
submitted evidence showing that he was a theology student. The local board did not 
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rationale that the error cannot be cured by appellate board considera-
tion of facts submitted independently of the whole file since these 
boards lack the power to "receive or consider any information other" 
than information found in the record.81 
A local board that fails to consider facts submitted with a valid 
request for reopening thereby fails to follow an express provision 
of the regulations as it has been interpreted by the courts. Since the 
initial reopening decision is a mandatory procedure that involves 
no fact-finding or exercise of discretion, it seems clear that a failure 
to make that decision constitutes "basically lawless" activity, which 
can be challenged by a registrant in a suit seeking preinduction ju-
dicial review of his claim.82 For example, in Murray v. Blatchford,83 
the court held that a local board's failure to consider the facts con-
tained in a request for reopening was one of several lawless activi-
ties engaged in by the board that justified the decision to grant the 
registrant preinduction judicial review of his case. 
It is submitted that the courts' position in requiring local boards 
at least to consider whether reopening is proper is entirely reason-
able. By placing a considerable limitation on the exercise of local 
board discretion and thereby curbing one aspect of arbitrary local 
board behavior, the courts have helped ensure that each registrant 
may have some minimal review of his claim. However, this limita-
tion deals only with one of several reopening abuses committed by 
the boards, and by itself it is insufficient to ensure complete fairness 
in the reopening process. The courts have been called upon to for-
mulate other limitations as well, and the discussion now turns to a 
consideration of these judicial developments. 
2. The Implicit Request 
As has just been noted,84 the courts have unanimously inter-
preted the regulations to require local boards to take the first step 
in the reopening process-that is, to decide whether newly submit-
consider the evidence but fonvarded it to the appeal board, which retained Berman 
in class I-A. The Federal District Court for the District of New Jersey granted habeas 
corpus, 107 F. Supp. 529 (D.N.J. 1952), and the Third Circuit affirmed on the ground 
that 32 C.F.R. §§ 1625.(1) and (2) require the local board to consider a request for 
reopening if the facts supporting the classification are reported within ten days after 
they occur. 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953). 
81. 32 C.F.R. § l626.24(b) (1970) provides: "In reviewing the appeal and classifying 
the registrant, the appeal board shall not receive or consider any information other 
than the following: 
(1) Information contained in the record received from the local board. 
(2) General information concerning economic, industrial, and social conditions." 
82. See Edwards v. Local Bd. No. 58, 313 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Pa. 1970), discussed 
in note 114 infra. 
83. 307 F. Supp. 1038 (D.R.!.), motion to dismiss denied sub nom. Murray v. Vaughn, 
300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.!. 1969). 
84. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. 
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ted facts justify reopening-when they are faced with a valid request 
for reopening. However, the question of precisely what constitutes 
a "valid" request has generated considerable disagreement among the 
courts that have considered the problem. The regulations specify 
that a registrant who seeks reopening through his local board must 
initiate the reopening process by submitting a written request ac-
companied by new facts. 85 Many boards interpret this regulation 
literally and require that the person seeking reopening submit a 
written request specifically asking for a reopening. Thus, local 
boards have refused to reopen when the request is made orallyB6 or 
when new facts included in a letter are unaccompanied by words 
specifically asking that the registrant's classification be reopened.B1 
The weight of authority in the courts, especially in the circuit 
courts of appeal, has supported a literal reading of the regulation.BB 
The effect of these decisions has been to establish the written request 
as a condition precedent to the existence of any duty on the part of 
the board to take the first step in the reopening process by consider-
ing new facts it has received. The courts give various reasons in 
support of a policy requiring a written request. In Hoapili v. United 
States,89 the court expressed concern that less than a literal interpreta-
tion of the regulations "could effectively obstruct economical and ex-
peditious military organization."90 Other courts have merely accepted 
the regulation at face value and have required a ·written request with-
out presenting any underlying reasons such as efficiency and orderli-
ness.91 
85. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
86. Hoapili v. United States, 395 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1968) (upholding local board's 
refusal to reopen upon an oral request made to a clerk); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 
F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (refusal to reopen upon an oral request made to local board 
chairman was improper since the chairman had a duty to reduce information to 
writing or direct the registrant to do so). 
87. E.g., United States v. Hasmuk, 419 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1970) (a letter communicat-
ing new facts is not a specific request for reopening); United States v. Whitaker, 395 
F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1968) (local board and court denied reopening on the ground that 
facts regarding ministerial exemption were not accompanied by a written request); 
Shaw v. United States, 264 F.2d ll8 (9th Cir. 1959) (local board's failure to consider 
statement that registrant was a minister upheld because not accompanied by a written 
request for reopening). 
88. United States v. Hasmuk, 419 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Whitaker, 
395 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1968); Hoapili v. United States, 395 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1968); 
United States v. Tucker, 374 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1967); Storey v. United States, 370 
F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1966); Shaw v. United States, 264 F.2d ll8 (9th Cir. 1959); United 
States v. Pyrtle, 299 F. Supp. ll03 (E.D. Mo. 1969); United States v. Jones, 263 F. Supp. 
943 (M.D. Ga. 1967), afjd., 387 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Thompson, 253 
F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Okla. 1966), afjd., 380 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1967). 
89. 395 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1968). 
90. 395 F .2d at 658. 
91. In United States v. Whitaker, 395 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1968), the court stated: 
"However, the letter written by Whitaker to the board did not request a reopening of 
his classification. There being no express request to reopen, the local board was not 
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However, it seems clear that requiring registrants to submit a 
written request must, of necessity, lead to arbitrary administration of 
the reopening process. On the one hand, the registrant who fails to 
submit a written request can be denied any consideration at all, even 
if he presents a claim that entitles him to a new classification. On the 
other hand, when the registrant fails to satisfy the written request 
requirement, the regulations allow, but do not require, his local 
board, unrestrained by a request or notice requirement, to reopen 
upon its own motion when presented with new facts and circum-
stances. 92 Yet, in numerous instances, local boards have refused to 
exercise that discretion when such an exercise would result in a classi-
fication favorable to the registrant. For example, in Shaw v. United 
States,93 the registrant submitted facts to show he was a minister, but 
the board failed to reopen or even consider reopening upon its own 
motion. Similarly, in Townsend v. Zimmerman,94 the registrant left 
his wife and child and, as a result, lost his III-A classification. He later 
returned to his family and informed the chairman of his local board 
of his changed status, but the board failed to reopen his classification. 
In contrast, when the exercise of discretion will yield a I-A classifi-
cation, local boards are much more disposed to use their "discretion" 
to reopen. For example, in Townsend, the board had received no 
request to reopen and classify the registrant I-A after he left his 
family. Nevertheless, it reopened on its own motion. 
As noted above, the requirement that the request be in writing 
and that it be accompanied by words specifically requesting reopen-
ing can have the effect of denying a registrant any review or determi-
nation of the merits of his claim if his board chooses not to reopen on 
its own motion. This literal interpretation of section 1625.2 places 
an enormous burden upon registrants since few registrants have 
access to, or any knowledge of, the regulations. Furthermore, it may 
be questioned whether denying review to a registrant who fails to 
satisfy this literal interpretation furthers any significant policies, 
Delay is one factor to consider, but it seems that a brief review by 
the board of whether reopening is appropriate would cause little 
delay. Moreover, the notions of fairness and of maintaining regis-
required to advise Whitaker that it would not reopen his classification." See also Shaw 
v. United States, 264 F.2d l18 (9th Cir. 1959). Shaw and Hoapili v. United States, 395 
F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1968), were both decided by the Ninth Circuit. In Shaw the court 
presented no underlying reasons for requiring an express request but preferred to rely 
on the regulation itself. However, in the face of other decisions that have adopted the 
implicit request approach (discussed at notes 100-15 infra and accompanying text), the 
Ninth Circuit in Hoapili seems to have considered it necessary to defend its position 
and the regulation by presenting the underlying reasons of efficiency and orderliness. 
395 F.2d at 658. 
92. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
93. 264 F.2d US (9th Cir. 1959). 
94. 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956). 
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trants in proper classifications emerge as major policies of the Act.95 
Therefore, what little delay might result would be outweighed by 
these statutory policies. Indeed, proper classification of registrants 
could have the effect of keeping numerous cases out of the courts, 
thereby benefiting both the Selective Service and the judicial system. 
Another possible reason for favoring a literal interpretation of 
section 1625.2 is to prevent perjury by registrants who falsely claim 
they have submitted oral requests for reopening. While this position 
may have merit, the problem of a lack of fundamental fairness still 
remains. Requiring the board or its employees to write down oral 
requests or to direct registrants to do so would seem to be a more 
suitable approach to the perjury problem than would denying the 
registrant any consideration of his claim.00 Thus, when local boards 
become aware of new facts, sound policy dictates that they should not 
be free to refuse reopening on the basis of a mere technicality, which 
at best serves a limited purpose. 
Furthermore, the fact that many courts favor a literal interpreta-
tion of the written request requirement leads to the conclusion that 
these courts are somewhat inconsistent in their approach to constru-
ing and interpreting the regulations. For example, in United States 
v. Norman,07 when faced with the ultimate issue whether a board 
must consider facts submitted to it with a proper written request, the 
Ninth Circuit, as have all courts, interpreted the word "may" to 
mean "must." Although the court held that the "language and spirit" 
of the regulations compelled this interpretation, as noted above,08 
the language of the regulations is permissive and thus the decision 
appears to rest solely upon the "spirit" of the regulations. Yet, in 
Storey v. United States,00 when the court considered the implicit re-
95. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 59 U.S.C. App. § 45l(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968), provides: 
The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privileges 
of serving in the armed forces and the reserve components thereof should be 
shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just, 
and which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective national economy. 
96. See Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956). In that case, the 
court held that 32 C.F.R. 1623.l (1971), which provides that "[u)nder no circumstances 
shall the local board rely upon information received by a member personally unless 
such information is reduced to writing and placed in the registrant's file," placed a 
"duty" upon a local board chairman "to make a written summary" of oral information 
submitted to him. 237 F.2d at 378. But see United States v. McKinney, 427 F.2d 449 
(6th Cir. 1970), in which the court held that an oral claim of conscientious objection 
raised during a security clearance interview need not be communicated to the board 
or considered by the board. 
97. 412 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1969). 
98. See text following note 76 supra. 
99. 370 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1966). In Storey, the registrant sought an exemption as 
a conscientious objector. While the claim was on appeal, he sent his local board a 
letter indicating that he had become a member of the Radio Church of God. The 
board failed to determine if reopening was proper but forwarded the letter to the 
appeal board. The court held that the failure to consider the newly submitted facts 
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quest issue-whether the "written request" requirement of the regu-
lation should be read literally-the Ninth Circuit appeared to ignore 
the "spirit" of the regulations and considerations of substantial justice 
by adopting a literal interpretation of this part of the regulation. 
In Storey, as in Norman, substantial justice to the registrant and 
the "spirit" of the regulations would seem to have called for a less 
than literal interpretation of the regulation. Yet, the court employed 
such an equitable interpretation only in Norman. However, the 
Ninth Circuit's varying approach in interpreting the regulations, as 
exemplified by the conflict between Storey and Norman, does illus-
trate that the role of the courts in eliminating arbitrariness in the 
Selective Service System has not been consistent. While the reasons 
for a vacillating position in construing the regulations remain un-
certain, such inconsistency can only foster arbitrariness and capricious 
behavior and procedures, or, at the very least, retard their elimina-
tion. It is submitted that in construing the written request require-
ment, as in construing the board's duty to reopen, an unwavering 
policy of interpreting the regulations so as to afford a registrant at 
least some consideration of his claim would certainly be more in 
accord with the basic notion of fairness and with minimal standards 
of due process. 
A minority of courts have recognized the inherent unfairness in 
the majority's literal interpretation of the written request require-
ment100 and have allowed oral requests or the submission of facts un-
accompanied by any request to operate as the "·written" request called 
for in the regulations.101 The rationale usually given in support of 
was not a denial of due process because the letter concerning the registrant's church 
membership did not expressly request reopening. It should be noted that the Ninth 
Circuit has also held that a writing asking for a personal appearance cannot be con-
sidered a request for reopening when new facts are not submitted. Frank v. United 
States, 236 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1956). 
100. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.ll(a) (1971) (emphasis added), which describes the procedure 
for taking an appeal, provides in part: "Any person entitled to do so may appeal to the 
appeal board by filing with the local board a written notice of appeal ••• [and] the 
language of any such notice shall be liberally construed in favor of the person filing 
the notice so as to permit the appeal." In contrast, the regulations governing reopening, 
32 C.F.R. § 1625 (1971), have no such provision. There seems to be no rational basis, 
however, why a request for reopening should have to meet the technical requirements 
of § 1625.2 while an appeal under § 1625 does not. It seems obvious that the purpose 
of both the right of appeal and reopening is to ensure that registrants are properly 
classified. See note 108 infra. Thus, the distinction that some courts have in effect 
created between a request for an appeal and a request for reopening rests on ques-
tionable grounds. 
101. United States v. Holmes, 426 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1970) (oral claim of conscientious 
obj~ction made at induction station held to satisfy requirements of the regulations); 
Uruted States v. Turner, 421 F.2d 1251 (3d Cir. 1970) (letter explaining beliefs of 
conscientious objection contained "implied" request); Vaughn v. United States, 404 F.2d 
586 (8th Cir. 1968) (letter informing board of beliefs as conscientious objector held a 
sufficient request for reopening even though registrant failed to use special form in 
making his request); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956) (oral 
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this position is that the submission of new facts constitutes an implicit 
request to reopen.102 Accordingly, the submission of new facts accom-
panied by the words "appeal"103 or "postponement"104 have been held 
to be sufficient to satisfy the regulations.ms 
In Vaughn v. United States,106 the Eighth Circuit, seemingly more 
concerned with notions of fairness than with over-technical construc-
tion of the regulations, held that "compliance with § 1621.11 is 
conducive to efficient processing of a claim for exemption .... [but] 
classification in accordance with the law should not rest upon tech-
nical considerations. Substance, not form, is the controlling factor."107 
request made to local board chairman held a sufficient request for reopening); United 
States ex rel. Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953) (request for an "appeal" held 
to be a request for reopening); United States ex rel. Vaccarino v. Officer of the Day, 
305 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (request for "postponement" of induction accom-
panied by subtnission of new facts should be treated as a request for reopening); 
United States v. Pollero, 300 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (subtnission of facts which 
would support a ministerial exemption ruled a proper request for reopening); United 
States v. Seeley, 301 F. Supp. 811 (D.R.I. 1969), United States v. Simms, 285 F. Supp. 981 
(D. Del. 1968) (subtnission of new facts deemed a request for reopening); United States 
v. Longworth, 269 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (letter requesting an "appeal" may be 
treated as a request for reopening if accompanied by new facts); United States v. Howe, 
144 F. Supp. 342 (D. Mass. 1956) (oral request for reopening held to satisfy requirement 
of a written request when board secretary mistakenly advised registrant that it was 
too late for reopening); Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F. Supp. 139 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (subtnission 
of new facts constitutes an implicit request for reopening). 
102. See cases cited in note 101 supra. 
103. United States v. Thompson, 431 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. 
Berman v. Craig, 207 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Longworth, 269 F. Supp. 
971 (S.D. Ohio 1967). 
104. United States ex rel. Vaccarino v. Officer of the Day, 305 F. Supp. 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969). 
105. It should be noted at this point that neither an e.,cpress request nor an implied 
request made after the mailing of an induction order will entitle a registrant to con-
sideration of whether reopening is justified unless the "board ••• finds there has been 
a change in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the regis-
trant had no control." 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). In United States v. Holmes, 426 F.2d 
915 (2d Cir. 1970), and United States ex rel. Vaccarino v. Officer of the Day, 305 F. Supp. 
732 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), there was a finding that the respective claims of hardship and 
conscientious objection arose through no control of the registrant and thus post• 
induction order requests for reopening were allowed. However, Holmes would be 
decided differently today in light of Ehlert v. United States, 39 U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. 
April 21, 1971), in which the Court held that the crystallization of a person's beliefs 
is not a circmnstance within the meaning of § 1625.2. Thus, the board would be power-
less to reopen. These matters are discussed further at notes 286-314 infra and accom-
pan}ing te.,ct. 
106. 404 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1968). 
107. 404 F.2d at 591. In United States ex rel. Bergdall v. Drum, 107 F.2d 897, 900 
(2d Cir. 1939), Judge Clarke noted that the protection of individual rights "do[es] not 
call for an over-technical construction of the regulations not necessary for such protec-
tion and merely hampering to the Government in its tremendous task of mobilizing its 
manpower into an effective fighting organization." In Vaughn, it appears that the 
Eighth Circuit has applied Judge Clarke's reasoning to the Government by holding that 
an over-technical construction of the regulations is not necessary to protect the Govern-
ment's interests. 
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This attitude seems more in accord with the over-all purpose of re-
opening, which is to ensure that all registrants are in the proper 
classification as specified in other regulations.108 In United States v. 
Simms,109 this purpose was clearly recognized when the court stated 
that the "discretion to reclassify does not operate solely to remove 
exemptions or deferments but to keep all registrants properly classi-
fied."110 
In summary, the state of the law with regard to the requirement 
of a written request is divided, with the majority of the federal 
circuits interpreting the regulation literally.111 However, a persuasive 
minority has dispensed with the absolute necessity for a written re-
quest when new facts are submitted to the local board in oral or in 
written form unaccompanied by an express request to reopen.112 The 
minority approach views the requirements of the regulation as being 
met by the implicit request inherent in the submission of new facts. 
In the minority view, a board must determine whether reopening is 
proper when the registrant submits information that might possibly 
support a new classification, even if he fails specifically to request 
reopening or makes an oral claim.113 
Furthermore, under the minority view, it seems that preinduction 
judicial review would be available in cases in which a local board 
fails to consider whether reopening is proper when the registrant 
submits either an oral request or new facts in writing but unaccom-
panied by a literal request for reopening.114 As interpreted by these 
courts, section 1625.2 requires the board in all cases in which a "re-
quest" is made to consider whether new facts justify reopening. 
108. Although the regulations do not expressly state that the over-all purpose of 
reopening is to maintain registrants in proper classifications, this may be fairly implied 
from 32 C.F.R. § 1625.l(c) (1971), which requires local boards "to keep informed of 
the status of classified registrants," and also from 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971), which 
authorizes the board to reopen upon its own motion when it becomes aware of "facts 
not considered when the registrant was classified." 
109. 285 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1968). 
110. 285 F. Supp. at 988 n.6. 
111. See cases cited at note 88 supra. 
112. See cases cited at note 101 supra. 
113. It should be emphasized that the board does not actually have to reopen when 
an express or implied request is submitted; it merely has to consider if the facts sub• 
mitted justify reopening. However, the board is required to reopen if the registrant 
presents a prima facie case. See notes 137-76 infra and accompanying text. 
114. See Edwards v. Local Bd. No. 58, 313 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Pa. 1970), in which 
the court held that it had jurisdiction to enjoin the induction of a registrant whose 
local board had failed to meet and consider his claim for a I-S(C) deferment. The 
court reasoned that the duty at least to meet and consider the claim was "implicit in 
32 C.F.R. § 1625.3(b) and 32 C.F.R. § 1604.52a(d)" and in failing to do so, the board 
"did not comply with the clear mandate of its own regulations." 313 F. Supp. at 652. 
In this case, the registrant had delivered a letter to his board specifically requesting a 
reopening. However, it seems that if a letter conveying new facts but not requesting a 
reopening is held to be an implicit request, the failure to consider these facts would 
be equally as lawless and subject to the Oestereich exception to § 10(b)(3). 
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Thus, the decision whether the newly submitted facts should be 
considered is mandatory and involves no fact-finding function or 
discretion. Therefore, a failure to consider these facts should be con-
sidered basically lawless activity, i.e., contrary to the regulations, 
which should support preinduction judicial review if the logic of 
Oestereich and Gabriel is interpreted to apply to procedural viola-
tions of the regulations.115 
However, under the majority approach-in which the courts have 
adopted a literal interpretation of the written request requirement 
of section 1625.2-the failure to consider newly submitted facts when 
section 1625.2 is not literally satisfied cannot be termed basically 
lawless because the board has followed the regulation. Following 
Oestereich and Gabriel, then, preinduction judicial review of that 
failure should be unavailable. And since a board's failure to consider 
the request because the literal requirements of section 1625.2 are 
not fulfilled does not invalidate an induction order, the registrant 
will lack a valid defense to a criminal prosecution or a basis for 
habeas corpus when he finally does obtain judicial review. 
3. De Facto Reopening 
Abuses of local board discretion have not been limited to the 
omission of any consideration of new facts offered by the registrant. 
"While some boards fail to consider requests for reopening, others go 
to a different extreme. These latter boards actually receive a request 
for reopening, thoroughly examine the information included in the 
request and evaluate the merits of the claim, and then notify the 
registrant that reopening is denied. In effect, the board bypasses the 
first step-determining whether reopening is justified on the facts 
submitted-and actually considers whether reclassification is proper. 
However, after determining the claim adversely to the registrant, the 
board only tells the registrant that it has failed to reopen.116 In effect, 
then, the board is trespassing over the boundary between the reopen-
ing decision and reclassification, and by doing so it is effectively deny-
ing the registrant the procedural rights of personal appearance and 
appeal to which he is entitled once an evaluation of the merits and 
truth of his claim begins.117 
This procedure contradicts the express language of the regula-
115. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text. 
116. See note 87 supra. 
117. United States v. Grier, 415 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1969), provides an excellent 
illustration of this abusive procedure. The registrant sought a hardship deferment and 
submitted a request for reopening. The local board investigated the claim by procuring 
a report from a county welfare department and holding an interview with the regis-
trant's brother. After determining that the claim was invalid, the board notified the 
registrant that it had decided not to reopen. The effect of this procedure was to deny 
Grier the right of appeal that normally accompanies reopening. 
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tions. If the board feels that it is not justified in reopening on the 
facts submitted and declines to consider the truth or merits of the 
facts, it may then refuse reopening and leave the registrant without 
the right of further review.118 But, if the board does believe that the 
facts, if true, would entitle the registrant to a new classification and 
then engages in the reclassification process by inquiring into the 
truth and merits of the claim, it has reopened and must first notify 
the person requesting reopening that it has either granted or denied 
the request, and, second, it must notify the requester of the pro-
cedural rights available.119 
The courts have reacted to this abuse by formulating the rule or 
doctrine of de facto reopening.120 Under this rule, a board that in-
quires into the merits of a claim is deemed to have reopened and 
must cancel any outstanding induction order and notify the registrant 
of his procedural rights of personal appearance and appeal. Failure 
to notify the registrant of these rights invalidates any subsequently 
issued induction or work order, or cancels any outstanding order. In 
effect, the courts give formal recognition to the fact that the board 
has reopened, although the board may not denote its actions as such. 
The leading case in the area of de facto reopening is Miller v. 
United States,121 in which the court clearly defined the rule and the 
rationale behind it. In that case, the registrant, Miller, sent his local 
board a completed form requesting a conscientious objector exemp-
tion. Although the local board evaluated the claim and subsequently 
rejected it, it told Miller that it had decided not to reopen his classifi-
cation. Miller refused induction and was convicted for violation of 
the Selective Service laws.122 In reversing Miller's conviction, the 
Ninth Circuit stated: 
The local board did not deal with the alleged facts or evidence of 
appellant's conscientious objector form as a question of whether this 
legally could provide basis for a reopening to be made, so as to en-
title consideration and evaluation to be engaged in thereafter under 
118. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.4 (1971) provides in part that 
[when] the local board is of the opinion that the information ••• fails to present 
any facts in addition to those considered when the registrant was classified or, even 
if new facts are presented, the local board is of the opinion that such facts, if true, 
would not justify a change in such registrant's classification, it shall not reopen the 
registrant's classification. In such a case, the local board, by letter, shall advise 
the person filing the request that the information submitted does not warrant the 
reopening of the registrant's classification •••• 
119. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1625.11-13 (1971). 
120. See, e.g., Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970); Witmer v. United States, 
348 U.S. 375 (1955); United States v. Bowen, 421 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1970); United 
States ex rel. Luster v. McBee, 422 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Grier, 415 
F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1969); Davis v. United States, 410 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1969); United 
States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Vincelli, 216 F.2d 681 
(2d Cir. 1954). 
121. 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967). 
122. 388 F.2d at 976. 
May 1971) Comments 1097 
the general classification procedure of the regulations. It shortcut the 
situation by directly proceeding, without purporting to reopen, to a 
consideration of whether appellant was entitled to a conscientious 
objector classification on the merits of the probative elements of its 
file.12a 
Thus, the court clearly recognized that "[t]his was action amounting 
to a determination of the question of classification" and then accu-
rately concluded that " ... the local board [had] engaged in the 
processes which were open to it under§ 1625.11, but with an ignor-
ing of the procedural prescription of§ 1625.11 for a reopening as a 
basis therefor."124 
Accordingly, the court held that Miller's board denied him due 
process of law by denying him the procedural right to a fair hearing 
of his claim as specified in sections 1625.2 and 1625.11. Furthermore, 
the court held that due process problems would still be present even 
if the regulations could possibly be construed to grant an implied 
power to the board to "engage in a general consideration and evalua-
tion and then to accord the result a summary status only."125 This is 
true, the court noted, because the regulations, in violation of the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment, would allow the local board to 
discriminate between the claims of two registrants. For example, a 
board could conceivably discriminate between two identical claims 
by reopening one and, at the same time, evaluating the second with-
out reopening-the registrant making the latter claim being denied 
the right of appeal.120 
The de facto reopening rule has become established in the circuit 
courts of appeal127 and recently has been approved by the Supreme 
Court in l'l!ulloy v. United States.128 Furthermore, since de facto re-
123. 388 F .2d at 976. 
124. 388 F.2d at 976. 
125. 388 F.2d at 976-77. 
126. 388 F.2d at 976-77. 
127. See note 120 supra. 
128. 398 U.S. 410 (1970). See also United States ex rel. Rasmussen v. Commanding 
Officer, 43'.l F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1970), in which the court concluded "that under Mulloy 
the procedural rights to a personal appearance and an appeal do not flow from a de 
facto reopening unless the registrant has first established a prima facie case for the 
requested classification." 430 F.2d at 838-39. However, neither Mulloy nor the cases 
cited at note 120 supra appear to have established that the registrant must present a 
prima fade case (discussed at notes 137-76 infra) as a condition precedent to the 
application of de facto reopening principles. Such a requirement would render the 
de facto reopening rule superfluous since the registrant is generally entitled to reopen-
ing and its attendant rights of personal appearance and appeal upon presentation of 
the prima facie case (see notes 21-32 supra and accompanying text), except when an 
induction order has been issued. See notes 198-254 infra and accompanying text. There-
fore, if the de facto reopening rule is to add anything to the registrant's rights and to 
the development of the law of reopening, it would necessarily have to apply to situa-
tions in which the registrant fails to present a prima facie case but his board neverthe-
less ignores the procedural prescription of the regulations by engaging in the reclassifi-
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opening can be classified as basically lawless activity that calls for no 
finding of fact or use of discretion, it would seem that preinduction 
judicial review of this abuse should be available.129 Once de facto 
reopening has been accepted as a general rule, however, there still 
exists the problem of defining what actions by the local board satisfy 
the rule so as to be deemed reopening. United States v. Grier130 
illustrates one side of the spectrum where no doubt lingers whether 
the board reopened in fact. Grier sought a hardship deferment, III-A, 
which his board denied. In reversing the registrant's conviction for 
refusing induction, the Fourth Circuit ruled that an "extensive in-
vestigation" of the merits of the claim-which included "procure-
ment of a report from the county welfare department" and "the 
holding of a personal interview with Grier's brother"-constituted 
de facto reopening.131 At the other end of the spectrum, the mere 
sending of a form to a conscientious objector132 certainly falls short of 
de facto reopening.133 Between these two extremes, Mulloy, as well 
as other decisions, 134 indicate that a personal appearance before the 
board is sufficient to constitute de facto reopening. While there are 
some cases to the contrary, they can be distinguished on other 
grounds.135 In light of Mulloy, therefore, a personal appearance 
should be sufficient to establish de facto reopening. 
cation decision without first reopening. Indeed, when the board undertakes to make 
the reclassification decision, a process that normally follows only after the presenta-
tion of a prima facie case, it should be estopped from claiming that the registrant failed 
to present a prima facie case. 
129. Rhem v. Local Bd. No. 104, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3437 (W.D. Wis. 1970). 
130. 415 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1969). 
131. 415 F.2d at 1101. 
132. Selective Serv. Sys. Form 150 is normally sent to registrants who request reopen-
ing on the ground of conscientious objection. The elements comprising the claim are 
supposed to be put on the form by the registrant and then returned to the board. See 
note 141 infra. 
133. United States v. Baker, 1 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3017 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); United 
States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966), afjd. on remand, 266 F. Supp. 161 
(S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967). In addition, 
none of the courts that have found that de facto reopening has occurred have men-
tioned that sending Selective Serv. Sys. Form 150 constitutes an element of de facto 
reopening. See, e.g., Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970); Miller v. United States, 
388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967). However, it has been recognized that sending out other 
forms to obtain information to aid in evaluating the claim may constitute de facto 
reopening. Kurjan v. Commanding Officer, 314 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
134. United States v. Westphal, 304 F. Supp. 951 (D.S.D. 1969); United States v. 
Baker, l SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3017 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); United States v. Clark, 105 F. Supp. 
613 (W.D. Pa. 1952). 
135. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Luster v. McBee, 422 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1970); 
Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970). The Luster decision, which 
relied heavily on United States v. Mulloy, 412 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1967), held that a 
personal appearance cannot be equated with de facto reopening. Since Mulloy v. United 
States, 398 U.S. 410 (1970), reversed the Sixth Circuit opinion, the Seventh Circuit might 
re-evaluate its position. The Scott decision held that once an induction order is mailed 
to a registrant who later raises a claim for a new classification, a personal appearance 
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Any further judicial development of the scope of de facto reopen-
ing will probably occur on a case-by-case basis.136 Nevertheless, the 
doctrine has already been well established and represents another 
important restraint that the courts have found necessary to impose on 
local board discretion in order to afford some measure of fairness to 
the registrant. 
4. The Prima Facie Case 
a. The Basic Rule and I ts Rationale. Several judicial restraints 
on the exercise of local board discretion in reopening cases have been 
discussed thus far. In some instances the courts find a request implicit 
in the submission of new facts when no request is expressly made.137 
In other situations, assuming a request has been made for reopening, 
the courts require the local board to take the preliminary step in the 
reopening process by compelling it to receive information and con-
sider and review that information to determine whether the facts, if 
true, would justify actual reopening and the evaluative analysis of 
the claim that flows from reopening.138 Both of these judicial develop-
ments are designed to ensure that the registrant has at least minimal 
board review and consideration of the facts comprising his claim. 
Under the de facto reopening rule,139 the courts merely give formal 
recognition to the fact that the board-although it has not denoted 
its action as such-has indeed reopened. It should be noted, however, 
that none of these developments forces the local board actually to 
reopen and evaluate the merits of the registrant's claim. 
The prime facie case rule, recently approved by the Supreme 
Court in :Mulloy v. United States,140 requires the local board to re-
will not constitute de facto reopening. Since 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971) specifically au-
thorizes the board to find an involuntary change in status before reopening after it has 
issued an induction order, the court reasoned that de facto reopening cannot occur. 
See notes 206-31 infra and accompanying text. 
136. Other cases that have added to the definition of de facto reopening include 
United States v. Price, 427 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1970) (appointment of an appeal agent 
does not constitute reopening); United States v. Vincelli, 216 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1954) 
(de facto reopening waives any argument that registrant has not notified board of 
change in status within ten days); United States ex rel. Tomback v. Bullock, 110 
F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ill. 1953) (local board's request of advice from State Director as to 
whether reopening is proper held not to be de facto reopening). 
137. See notes 85-115 supra and accompanying text. 
138. See notes 73-83 supra and accompanying text. 
139. See notes 116-36 supra and accompan}ing text. 
140. 398 U.S. 410 (1970). "[T]he courts of appeals in virtually all Federal Circuits, 
have held that where the registrant has set out new facts that establish a prima facie 
case for a new classification, a board must reopen to determine whether he is entitled 
to that classification." 398 U.S. at 415. Among these cases are United States v. Grier, 
415 F.2d 1098 (4tli Cir. 1969); Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1969); 
United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967); Miller v. United States, 388 
F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Gearey, 379 F.2d 915 n.11 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967);United States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
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open and engage in an evaluative determination of the merits of a 
registrant's claim. In Mulloy, the petitioner, classified I-A, wrote his 
local board on October 17, 1967, and informed it that he had "con-
cluded" that he was a conscientious objector. The clerk of his board 
sent him a Selective Service System Form 150,141 for use by conscien-
tious objectors, which Mulloy completed in detail stating the reasons 
for and sources of his objection. Among the reasons and sources he 
noted were his religious training as a youth, his thoughts early in life 
that he might someday become a Catholic priest, his experience 
with antipoverty work in Appalachia, and the influence on him of 
Thomas Merton, a teacher of nonviolence. The sincerity of Mulloy's 
beliefs was supported in five letters written to the local board. The 
petitioner's brother noted that he disagreed with his brother's beliefs 
but that he never doubted his sincerity. A Catholic priest "wrote of 
the petitioner's honesty and integrity and said that he felt military 
service would do violence to the petitioner's conscience."142 After a 
personal appearance on November 9, 1967, the board voted on Janu-
ary 11, 1968, to deny reopening despite Mulloy's strong showing of 
conscientious objection. On January 21, 1968, Mulloy sought to ap-
peal the board's decision because he considered the November inter-
view a reopening of his case. The board denied that it had reopened 
and ordered Mulloy to report for induction in February. Mulloy 
refused to report in violation of the Military Selective Service Act 
of 1967 and was sentenced to five years imprisonment and fined 
10,000 dollars. 
The Supreme Court, in an eight-zero decision,143 reversed Mulloy's 
conviction. After noting the procedural consequences associated with 
reopening, the Court declared, "Though the language of 32 CFR 
§ 1625.2 is permissive, it does not follow that a board may arbitrarily 
refuse to reopen a registrant's classification."144 The Court then 
reiterated and affirmed the prima fade case rule previously adopted 
by numerous lower courts that had dealt with reopening cases.1415 
Under the prima fade case rule, a local board "must" reopen a regis-
trant's classification "where the registrant has set out new facts that 
establish a prima fade case for a new classification."146 Any failure to 
reopen under these circumstances is deemed an abuse of board 
discretion. 
141. 32 C.F.R. § 1621.11 (1971) imposes a mandatory duty on the board to supply a 
registrant a Special Form for Conscientious Objectors (Form 150) upon request. Failure 
to do so will invalidate a conviction for refusal of induction. United States v. Bowen, 
414 F.2d 1268 (3d Cir. 1969). 
142 398 U.S. at 413. 
143. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of the case. 
144. 398 U.S. at 415. 
145. See note 140 supra. 
146. 398 U.S. at 415. 
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Having recognized the rule and thereby modified the express 
language of the regulations, the Court set out to define the rule and 
its elements somewhat more precisely: 
Where a registrant makes nonfrivolous allegations of facts that have 
not been previously considered by his board, and that, if true, would 
be sufficient under regulation or statute to warrant granting the re-
quested reclassification, the board must reopen the registrant's classi-
fication unless the truth of these new allegations is conclusively 
refuted by other reliable information in the registrant's file.147 
In analyzing this statement, the two basic elements comprising the 
prima fade case must be considered separately. First, the registrant 
must submit nonfrivolous allegations of fact that are not conclusively 
refuted by other information in the registrant's file. Thus, "plainly 
incredible" claims need not compel reopening since they are frivo-
lous;148 the same is true of claims based on facts already considered 
by the local board. However, a claim is not frivolous merely because 
it is based on facts that are not new. A registrant who points out facts 
already in his file but not previously considered by the local board 
can also be considered to have submitted nonfrivolous allegations of 
facts.149 In addition, the facts presented by the registrant must not be 
refuted by other reliable information in the registrant's file. This 
limitation on the rule represents a modification of the view expressed 
by the Ninth Circuit in Miller v. United States150 in which the court 
held that the local board must accept the new facts as true and that 
the other facts in the registrant's file cannot be used to impeach the 
new facts. Miller seemed to equate a probative weighing of old facts 
in the file against new facts just submitted with de facto reopening. 
Mulloy refuted this analysis, however, and added further defini-
tion to the de facto reopening concept by allowing the local board 
to use the registrant's file to impeach new facts without actually re-
opening. The Court did acknowledge, though, that any further in-
vestigation of the claim, such as the personal appearance, would 
constitute de facto reopening.151 
Second, if the facts are nonfrivolous and uncontradicted by the 
record, then, accepting them as true, they must be sufficient under 
current regulations or statute "to warrant granting the requested 
classification."162 This requirement, a determination whether the 
147. 398 U.S. at 416. The Court relied heavily on United States v. Burlich, 257 
F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
148. 398 U.S. at 416 n.6. 
149. See Bradshaw v. United States, 242 F.2d 180 (10th Cir. 1957) ("facts not con-
sidered previously" are not necessarily synonymous with new facts). 
150. 388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967). 
151. 398 U.S. at 417. 
152. 398 U.S. at 416. 
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facts, if accepted as true, justify reclassification can by itself require 
the use of a substantial amount of discretion. In cases involving 
certain deferments or exemptions-such as the student deferment-
the determination of the adequacy of the facts needed to entitle the 
registrant to a new classification is relatively easy because the local 
board merely decides whether the registrant is currently enrolled as 
a full-time undergraduate student. However, the process of determin-
ing what showing of facts constitutes a prima facie case for a hardship 
deferment or for conscientious objection is far more complicated. 
Subjective evaluations of hardship and the sincerity of an individual's 
beliefs are involved in such cases, and the formulation of precise 
standards of a prima fade showing poses great difficulties for a local 
board. Furthermore, a uniform standard is quite illusory since sub-
jective evaluations and opinions will likely differ from board to 
board. In Mulloy, the Court did not treat the question of how a par-
ticular registrant must proceed in making a prima fade case. In 
United States v. Seeger153 and other cases,154 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to define more precisely the elements of the prima fade case 
for conscientious objection cases, but considerable room still remains 
for the local boards to exercise and abuse their discretion in deciding 
a registrant's fate. Thus it seems probable that future litigation will 
be necessary to define more clearly the elements of the prima facie 
case for hardship, conscientious objection, and other discretionary 
deferments. 
In Mulloy, the Court found that the petitioner had presented a 
prima facie case and that his local board had thus improperly refused 
to reopen. In reversing Mulloy's conviction, the Court noted that the 
"statutory standard for a classification as a conscientious objector"155 
had been met, and it then proceeded to present the rationale for its 
acceptance of the prima facie rule. In the Court's opinion, two major 
considerations seemed to weigh heavily in support of the rule. First, 
the Court noted that once a prima facie case, unrefuted by informa-
tion in the registrant's file, has been presented, " ... there can be no 
basis for the board's refusal to reopen except an evaluative deter-
mination adverse to the registrant's claim on the merits. And, it is 
just this sort of determination that cannot be made without affording 
the registrant a chance to be heard and an opportunity for an ad-
ministrative appeal."156 Thus, the Court acknowledged-albeit not 
expressly-the relationship of the de facto reopening rule to the 
153. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
154. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 396 U.S. 816 (1970) (holding that one need not 
necessarily believe in a Supreme Being to qualify as a conscientious objector). See also 
United States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (defining the prima facie 
case for the III-A hardship deferment). 
155. 398 U.S. at 417. 
156. 398 U.S. at 416. 
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prima facie case rule-that is, when a prima fade case has been sub-
mitted to the board, it has no basis on which to reject the claim except 
by an evaluation of the claim itself. And since, by its evaluation of the 
claim, the board has in fact reopened, it cannot deny the registrant his 
right to appeal by labelling its action a refusal to reopen. 
As a second consideration in support of the prima facie rule, the 
Court recognized "the narrowly limited scope of judicial review avail-
able to a registrant" and concluded that "the opportunity for full 
administrative review is indispensable to the fair operation of the 
Selective Service System."157 Thus, a board should not be allowed to 
deprive the registrant of any right of appeal and review available to 
him, by reopening in fact but not characterizing this action as a re-
opening. In effect, the Court merely expressed the rationale behind 
the de facto reopening rule rather than a separate rationale for the 
prima facie case rule. The de facto reopening rule ensures that a 
registrant is afforded a full measure of review. Yet, as noted above, 
the prima facie case rule has a close relationship to de facto reopen-
ing in that once a prima facie case is established, reopening in fact 
provides the only basis for rejection of the claim. 
After presenting the rationale for the prima facie case rule, the 
Court fielded the Government's argument "that if a local board must 
reopen whenever a prima facie case for reclassification is stated by the 
registrant, he will be able to postpone his induction indefinitely and 
the administration of the Selective Service System will be under-
mined. "158 After noting that the prima facie case rule as formulated 
will screen out most unmeritorious claims, the Court responded to 
this argument by pointing out that "a registrant who makes false 
statements to his draft board is subject to severe criminal penal-
ties."159 While criminal penalties no doubt do deter many registrants 
from making false statements, it must be conceded that the prima 
facie case rule will cause some delay in the administration of the 
Selective Service System-i.e., in those cases in which registrants have 
told the truth and are willing to refuse induction because they believe 
their claims to be genuine and nonfrivolous. This delay will probably 
occur when the board is called upon to make subjective determina-
tions of hardship and conscientious objection. Nevertheless, not all 
registrants are willing to incur the consequences associated with pros-
ecution for refusal to submit to induction, especially when they have 
presented a borderline case. Furthermore, in light of the vast man-
power pools available for induction and the relatively small current 
and projected needs of the armed services,160 some delay can be justi-
157. 398 U.S. at 416. 
158. 398 U.S. at 418 n.7. 
159. 398 U.S. at 418 n.7. 
160. See J. DAVIS 8e K. DOLBEARE, l.nTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE 
SEllVICE SYSTEM 130-31 (1968). 
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fied when a registrant's rights under the Act and regulations are at 
stake. Efficiency and expediency are questionable bases for depriva-
tion of an individual's right of due process of law.161 In formulating 
the prima fade case rule, it seems that the Supreme Court and the 
various circuit courts of appeal have begun to recognize this principle 
and accordingly have refused to follow a hands-off attitude toward 
selective service matters. 
b. Preinduction Judicial Review of Local Board Application of 
the Prima Facie Standard. As previously suggested, if the courts con-
tinue to interpret the principles of Oestereich and Gabriel as apply-
ing to "regulatory lawlessness," preindurtion judicial review of a 
local board's failure to comply with the mandatory procedures pro-
vided for in the regulations should be generally available to regis-
trants.162 However, extension of the logic of Oestereich and Gabriel 
to suits in which the registrant claims that the local board erred in 
the application of the prima fade standard may preclude preinduc-
tion review in many cases. When a registrant seeks certain exemptions 
and deferments such as conscientious objection and hardship, his 
local board is called upon to evaluate the facts presented and exercise 
its discretion in determining whether a prima fade claim has been 
presented. In these situations, the board's refusal to reopen after its 
analysis of the data cannot be fitted into the Oestereich exception of 
basically lawless activity. Thus, most courts have construed section 
IO(b)(3) and Gabriel to bar preinduction judicial review of local 
board application of the prima fade standard in cases in which 
claims of hardship163 and conscientious objection164 have been raised. 
However, preinduction judicial review should be available when 
the classification sought is mandatory and not dependent upon the 
discretion and analysis of the local board. Thus, the registrant seek-
ing a mandatory deferment or exemption, such as the student defer-
ment, which entails virtually no discretion or fact finding, could 
obtain preinduction judicial review of his board's refusal to reopen, 
despite the prohibitions of section 10(b)(3).165 In this type of situa-
161. See Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Commn. of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 
305 (1937); Cella v. United States, 208 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 
1016 (1954). 
162. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text. 
163. Steiner v. Commander, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3588 (5th Cir. 1970); Pasquier v. 
Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D. La. 1970); Grossfeld v. Morris, 303 F. Supp. 227 (D. Md. 
1969); Ryan v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Gee v. Smith, 306 F. Supp. 
891 (N.D. Ga. 1969). 
164. Ferrell v. Local Bd. No. 38, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3395 (2d Cir. 1970); Boyk v. 
Mitchell, 425 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1970); Czepil v. Hershey, 425 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1969); 
Sloan v. Local Bd. No. 1, 414 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1969); Gabel v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 
524 (E.D. Va. 1970); Ryan v. Hershey, 308 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Mo. 1969). Contra, Murray 
v. Blatchford, 307 F. Supp. 1038, motion to dismiss denied sub nom. Murray v. Vaughn, 
300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969); Barker v. Hershey, 309 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Wis. 1969). 
165. See Keibler v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 170, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3294 
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tion, a failure by the board to reopen when presented with a valid 
request for the mandatory deferment or exemption would be con-
sidered basically lawless activity, and therefore subject to preinduc-
tion review under the Oestereich exception to section IO(b)(3).166 
c. Problems with the Present Rule. It may be premature to pre-
sume that the prima facie case rule by itself can curb local board ex-
cesses and thereby facilitate the reopening process. Neither the 
courts 167 nor Congress168 have formulated standards defining pre-
(N.D.N.Y. 1970) (in which the court held that it had preinduction jurisdiction to order 
the board to reclassify a registrant who asserted the nondiscretionary right to a student 
deferment): Lang v. Mitchell, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3484 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (in which the 
court held that the registrant was statutorily entitled to a IV-A deferment as a sole 
surviving son and that his board's denial of that classification supports preinduction 
judicial review). 
166. On the face of the Act and regulations, mandatory nondiscretionary deferments 
and exemptions would appear to be the exemption for veterans of military service 
(class IV-A), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(b) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.40(a)(l)-(9) (1971); 
the exemption for ministerial students and ministers (class IV-D), 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 456(g) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43 (1971): the undergraduate student deferment 
(class 11-S), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25 
(1971); the student deferment for completion of the academic year (class 1-S), 50 U.S.C. 
App. § 456(i) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.15 (1971): the deferment for elected officials 
(class IV-B), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(£) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.41 (1971); and the 
aviation cadet deferment (class 1-D), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(e) (1964) and 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1622.13(c) (1971). Discretionary nonmandatory exemptions and deferments would 
appear to include the conscientious objector exemptions (class I-A-O and I-O), 50 
U.S.C. App. § 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), amending 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j) 
(1964), and 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.11, 14 (1971); the dependency deferment (class III-A) 50 
U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968), and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.30 (1971); and the occupational deferment (class II-A), 50 
U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1964), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968), and 32 C.F.R. § 1622.22 (1971). However, not all courts have viewed the various 
classifications in this manner. See, e.g., Bookout v. Thomas, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3230 
(9th Cir. 1970) (holding that the refusal to reopen the classification of a registrant 
who alleges that he is a full-time minister is not subject to preinduction judicial 
review); Evans v. Local Bd. No. 73, 425 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1970) (denying preinduc-
tion review of a board's failure to grant a II-S deferment to a registrant enrolled in a 
vocational school because the board was required to use discretion to determine whether 
the school is a proper institution of learning); Coleman v. Local Bd. No. 61, 432 F.2d 
225 (10th Cir. 1970) (denying preinduction judicial review of a local board's refusal to 
grant a 1-S(C) deferment). 
167. While the courts have attempted to formulate some standards (see cases cited 
at note 154 supra), prior cases have served inadequately as meaningful guides to regis-
trants. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rasmussen v. Commanding Officer, 430 F.2d 832 
(8th Cir. 1970), in which the court denied habeas corpus to a registrant who alleged 
that his local board had failed to reopen upon his application for a III-A hardship 
claim because the registrant failed to make a prima facie showing by alleging financial 
contribution and e.xtreme hardship. These standards were clearly established in United 
States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). However, most registrants do not 
have access to or the ability to locate prior judicial opinions, and thus these opinions 
have limited value to uncounseled registrants. The regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 1622 (1971), 
would also appear to provide some guidance for the registrant. However, Local Board 
Memorandums issued by the Director of Selective Service result in substantial "dilution, 
amplification, and (sometimes) alteration of those standards" because " ••• boards are 
technically free to disregard the LBM's and many of them do so, although to an un-
predictable and varying extent •••. " H. Shattuck, III, Record Keeping Obligations 
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cisely what constitutes a prima fade case, and thus not only are 
registrants left to guess at what showing is required of them, but they 
are also subjected to varying and inconsistent local board interpreta-
tions. The dual-element definition of the prima facie case-nonfrivo-
lous facts must be presented that would support a new classification 
if later proved true169-merely begs the basic question of what stan-
dards should be employed because it is not clear what precise facts 
are necessary to support a hardship claim or a claim for conscientious 
objection. At best the standards remain vague and subject to incon-
sistent applications by local boards. 
The absence of adequate standards for establishing a prima fade 
case becomes especially troublesome when a registrant has to submit 
all the facts necessary to support a new classification or lose his op-
portunity for reopening and reclassification. The registrant who has 
a valid claim but fails to include all the essential facts probably will 
be denied any review of the merits of his claim or even an oppor-
tunity to submit the remainder of his claim at a later hearing.170 The 
problems with this procedure, which allows the ultimate determina-
tion of a claim to rest upon the registrant's precise and complete sub-
mission of facts, are obvious. Given the lack of classification standards, 
the registrant is often unable to determine what facts are crucial to 
the reopening of his classification. It also should be remembered that 
even if such standards were available, most registrants lack the skills 
of an attorney. Indeed, most registrants have probably never heard 
of the prima facie rule, much less know what it involves. Further-
more, the Selective Service System discourages the use of attorneys 
in Selective Service matters.171 In this light, then, the current formu-
lation of the prima facie case rule, which cuts off claims without the 
opportunity for a fair hearing, can fairly be described as an arbitrary 
mechanism that is little better than no rule at all. 
As long as reopening standards remain vague, fairness to the 
of Local Boards, l SEL. SERv. L. REP. 4015, 4017 (1968). The inability of the registrant 
to ascertain classification standards from prior court cases and the regulations has been 
further complicated by decisions holding that the local board has no affirmative duty 
to inform him of these standards. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 373 F.2d 894 (5th 
Cir. 1967); Rase v. United States, 129 F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1942). However, the boards are 
not free to misinform the registrant, Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 
1959), or to ignore a registrant's written request for information about the regulations, 
United States v. Liberato, 109 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1953). 
168. The autonomy given local boards seems to be intentional. In 1967, the Senate 
rejected an amendment to the Act that would have imposed binding uniform national 
standards for classification. 113 CONG. R.Ec. 12,499 (1967). 
169. See note 147 supra and accompanying text. 
170. This was the situation in United States ex rel. Rasmussen v. Commanding 
Officer, 430 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1970). See note 167 supra. 
171. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.l(b) (1971), which deals with the personal appearance, pro-
vides in part: "No registrant may be represented before the local board by anyone 
acting as attorney or legal counsel." 
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registrant demands more than what the prima facie case rule, as 
presently interpreted, and the present regulations provide. The regis-
trant should at least have the opportunity for a hearing or an inter-
view to explain his claim and its elements more fully. Changes in the 
regulatory guidelines could be effected so as to allow the registrant 
a personal appearance before his board on the issue of reopening. 
These changes could be drafted in a manner to avoid the problems 
of de facto reopening occurring merely on the basis of the inter-
view172 and to preclude any further appeal from a denial of reopen-
ing. If reopening were refused, no further administrative avenues 
would exist. If the board reopened, the usual procedures would apply. 
This framework would help ensure that the elements of the claim 
become fully knmm to the board before it votes on reopening and at 
the same time would involve only a minimal amount of additional 
delay. 
The inherent difficulties in formulating a prima fade case for 
classifications such as hardship or conscientious objection are further 
intensified by the current state of the law in the area of preinduction 
judicial review. As suggested above,173 when the classification desired 
involves the exercise of board discretion and an evaluation of evi-
dence, preinduction judicial review of the decision not to reopen 
will probably be denied. Thus, registrants claiming hardship or 
conscientious objector classifications will be unable to obtain pre-
induction review as a decision to award these classifications involves 
a considerable amount of board discretion.174 The registrant's only 
available remedies will be to refuse induction and present his claim 
as a defense to a criminal prosecution or to accept induction and sue 
for a writ of habeas corpus. Neither of these alternatives is particu-
larly attractive to a registrant who has a borderline claim. Yet, it is 
submitted that the registrant who does have a borderline claim or 
who claims a discretionary deferment such as conscientious objection 
or hardship is the very person to whom the availability of preinduc-
tion review is most important. Because such vague standards-or no 
standards at all-exist in cases involving these discretionary classifica-
tions, the registrant cannot be certain whether he has presented a 
prima fade claim, and a decision to refuse induction or seek habeas 
corpus and risk the attendant consequences may be quite traumatic. 
In order to raise his claim the registrant is forced to subject himself to 
substantial risks. On the other hand, preinduction judicial review 
will probably be available to the registrant who is seeking a manda-
tory deferment-such as a student deferment-which entails virtually 
172. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text. 
173. See notes 47-72 supra and accompanying text. 
174. See notes 162-66 supra and accompanying text. 
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no discretion or fact-finding.175 Preinduction review is not nearly so 
crucial to this registrant, and a refusal to accept induction involves 
less uncertainty because the deferment or exemption he seeks is 
mandatory. If his local board fails to reopen, he can refuse induction 
and be relatively sure that he has a good defense (his board's failure 
to reopen upon presentation of a prima facie case) to any ensuing 
prosecution. The registrant has no such assurances, however, when 
a discretionary claim is involved. 
Thus, under the current state of the law, preinduction judicial 
review is not available to the registrant who, because of the uncertain 
nature of his claimed deferment or exemption and the risks he faces, 
most needs such review, while the individual to whom preinduction 
review is less crucial does have access to such review. Given this 
status of preinduction review, the lack of standards for reopening 
becomes even more crucial to those registrants with borderline or 
discretionary claims. If more precise standards for reopening existed, 
the registrant and his attorney would be able to determine what com-
prises a prima fade case; without such standards any decision must 
be made with uncertainty and considerable risk. The net effect of a 
lack of standards for determining what constitutes a prima facie case 
may very well be that registrants with borderline claims may be un-
willing to raise them in court because of a fear of prosecution or 
reprisal from military authorities if a ·writ of habeas corpus is sought. 
Thus, a strong case can be made for uniform classification stan-
dards to aid in the implementation of the prima facie case rule.176 
While uniform standards would lack the flexibility of the present 
system, it is this very flexibility that has been employed by local 
boards to deny registrants procedural due process rather than to 
accommodate extenuating cases. Perhaps a more rigid set of classifica-
tion guidelines, restricting the discretion vested in the local boards, 
would avoid many of the problems inherent in the present formula-
tion of the prima fade case rule. 
5. Arbitrary Reopening 
The majority of reopening problems arise when the registrant 
seeks to have his classification reopened for consideration of new facts 
175. See notes 165-66 supra and accompanying text. 
176. See SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE &: PROC., SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, A 
STUDY OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: !TS OPERATION, PRACTICES &: PROCEDURES (1970), 
which advocates classification standards. See also Donahue, The Supreme Court vs. 
Section 10(bX3) of the Selective Service Act: A Study in Ducking Constitutional Is-
sues, 17 UCLA L. R.Ev. 908, 967 (1970), in which the author suggests that a special-
ized Selective Service court, which would be the sole court for judicial review of the 
Selective Service, would by its decisions "provide standards for the local boards on 
such questions as the quantum of evidence the registrant must present to make a 
prima fade case for reopening of a classification." 
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and circumstances.177 Typically, he is unhappy with this classification 
and is attempting to secure a classification that will reduce his vulner-
ability to the draft or coincide more closely with his religious beliefs. 
However, in some situations a registrant who is satisfied with his draft 
status finds that his local board has reopened and reclassified him-
usually to a I-A classification. The important issue then is to deter-
mine whether the board was justified in reopening. 
Regulation 1625.2 provides in part that the local board may re-
open a registrant's classification "upon its own motion if such action 
is based upon facts not considered when the registrant was classified 
which, if true, would justify a change in the registrant's classifica-
tion.''178 A board acts without the authority of the Act or the regula-
tions if it reopens without a prior finding of new or previously un-
considered facts. Accordingly, the courts have been unanimous in 
their condemnation of this kind of reopening, often termed arbitrary 
reopening.179 For example, in United States v. Pence,180 the registrant 
was classified I-O as a conscientious objector until he refused to re-
port for a physical examination prior to assignment for noncomba-
tant service, wrote his board stating his objections to the Vietnam 
war, and refused to volunteer for civilian work by not completing 
a conscientious objector form.181 Pence was subsequently reclassified 
I-A by his local board, and he refused induction and was prosecuted 
for draft evasion. In reversing the conviction the Eighth Circuit 
stated, "It is well settled that reclassification of a registrant must be 
based upon some fact not considered in granting the original classi-
fication which would justify a change in classification.''182 In refer-
ence to Pence's antiwar activities the court noted that "[n]one of 
these incidents are in any way related to a factual change justifying 
a reclassification,"183 and declared that violations of "Selective Ser-
vice laws cannot serve as a basis for a board's retaliation by depriving 
a selectee of a statutory exemption.''184 
177. All the cases involving de facto reopening, an implicit request, the prima 
facie case rule, or instances in which the board failed to consider new facts offered 
to it arise in situations in which the registrant actively seeks reopening rather than 
when he tries to avoid it. See notes 84-176 supra and accompanying text. 
178. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
179. See United States v. Pence, 410 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. 
Carrol, 398 F.2d 651 (lid Cir. 1968); Lewis v. Secretary, Dept. of the Army, 402 F.2d 
813 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Brown, 290 F. Supp. 542 (D. Del. 1968); United 
States v. Wymer, 284 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Iowa 1968); United States v. Thomas, Crim. 
No. 229-54 (D.N.J. 1954); United States v. Owens, Crim. No. 10,528 (M.D. Ala. 1953); 
United States v. Ryals, 56 F. Supp. 773 (N.D. Ga. 1944). 
180. 410 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1969). 
181. See note 132 supra. 
182. 410 F.2d at 562. 
183. 410 F.2d at 562. 
184. 410 F.2d at 562. Cf. Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970); Oestereich 
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Thus, without a finding of new or previously unconsidered facts, 
the board lacks the power to reopen upon its own motion. If the 
board does reopen and acts to reclassify the registrant, it does so 
arbitrarily and any subsequently issued induction or work order will 
be declared void by the courts.185 Furthermore, it would seem that a 
board that reopens without first finding new or previously uncon-
sidered facts has engaged in basically lawless activity that involves 
no examination of facts or exercise of discretion. This regulatory law-
lessness would appear to fall within the Oestereich exception and 
thus be susceptible to preinduction judicial review.186 However, sec-
tion 1625.2 does authorize the board to reopen on its own motion "if 
such action is based upon facts not considered when the registrant 
was classified."187 These facts do not necessarily need to be new facts 
or newly submitted facts; the regulation requires merely that they 
be previously unconsidered. In Bradshaw v. United States,188 the 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a "board may re-
open and reconsider its former determination whenever it appears 
that it erred in failing to consider all available material facts."189 
Under this approach it is conceivable that a board could reopen at 
any time it discovered facts in a registrant's file that it had not con-
sidered initially. Thus, a registrant's classification could, in effect, be 
changed without any actual change in his physical, spiritual, or oc-
cupational status because after his initial classification his board 
"finds" facts that it failed to consider when it classified him originally. 
The arbitrary reopening rule has been applied in situations 
where the board has no punitive purpose in mind but merely re-
considers its position.190 And, as illustrated by Pence, the rule has 
been used to strike down punitive reclassifications that result from a 
registrant's violation of the Selective Service laws. The recent case of 
Gutknecht v. United States191 bears a close relationship to cases in-
v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968); Dickenson v. United States, 
346 U.S. 389 (1953). 
185. See cases cited at note 179 supra. 
186. It should be noted that this proposition is tentative, at best, since the issue 
has not yet been considered by any court. 
187. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
188. 242 F.2d 180 (10th Cir. 1957). For the possible impact of this case on the 
prima facie case rule, see notes 148-49 supra and accompanying text. 
189. 242 F.2d at 186. 
190. See, e.g., Lewis v. Secretary, Dept. of the Army, 402 F.2d 813 (9th Cir. 1968). 
In Lewis the registrant was classified III-A (hardship) in 1964 because he had a de-
pendent mother. In 1966 his local board reclassified him I-A (available for military 
service) without a prior finding of changed circumstances. The court granted Lewis 
a writ of habeas corpus, thereby releasing him from the service. The court noted that 
the facts relating to the dependency of Lewis' mother were substantially the same in 
1966 as they were in 1964. Thus, the board was powerless to reopen and reclassify the 
registrant. 
191. 396 U.S. 295 (1970). 
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volving arbitrary reopening in which the local board's purposes are 
punitive. In Gutknecht, the registrant, classified I-A, turned in his 
draft card to his local board and was soon classified as a delinquent 
under the delinquency regulations.192 Since the regulation provided 
that delinquents were to be given priority induction, Gutknecht soon 
received his induction order; he refused induction and was convicted 
of violating the Selective Service laws. Because Gutknecht was only 
twenty years old he probably would not have been inducted as soon 
as he was if he had not been declared delinquent.193 In reversing his 
conviction the Supreme Court invalidated the delinquency regula-
tion as unauthorized by the Act after a vain search "for any clues 
that Congress desired the Act to have punitive sanction apart from 
the criminal prosecutions specifically authorized."194 
The Court's holding in Gutknecht then would seem to reinforce 
the approach in the arbitrary reopening cases that the regulations 
cannot be employed punitively to deny a registrant his lawful exemp-
tion or deferment.195 Yet, Gutknecht's induction pursuant to the 
delinquency regulations can be distinguished from arbitrary reopen-
ing on two grounds. First, Gutknecht was classified I-A prior to the 
activities leading up to his induction and no reopening or reclassifica-
tion did occur-his induction was merely moved up.196 Second, 
assuming Gutknecht had been reclassified I-A from another classifica-
tion, there still could not have been a finding of arbitrary reopening 
even though his physical, spiritual, or occupational status had not 
192. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1642.1-46 (1971). Section 1642.4(a) provides: 
Whenever a registrant has failed to perform any duty or duties required of him 
under the selective service law other than the duty to comply with an Order to 
Report for Induction .•• or the duty to comply with an Order to Report for 
Civilian Work ••• , the board may declare him to be a delinquent. 
193. The Court noted: 
By virtue of the declaration of delinquency be [Gutknecht] was moved to the first 
of the categories which meant, according to the brief of the Department of Jus-
tice, that "it is unlikely that petitioner, who was 20 years of age when ordered to 
report for induction, would have been called at such an early date had he not 
been declared a delinquent." 
396 U.S. at 299. 
194. 396 U.S. at 307. After Gutknecht was decided, local boards were ordered to 
terminate the delinquency reclassification process. Selective Serv. Local Bd. Memoran-
dum No. 101 Gan. 21, 1970). 
195. See notes 182-84 supra and accompanying text. 
196. 32 C.F.R. § 1642.12 (1970) provided that a delinquent registrant could be 
reclassified I-A, I-A-0, or 1-0 by his local board. However, a registrant already classi-
fied in one of these classifications was not reclassified but was declared delinquent 
and ordered to report for induction before all other nondelinquents pursuant to 32 
C.F.R. §§ 1631.7, .13 (1970). Furthermore, 32 C.F.R. § 1642.14 (1970) only granted the 
right of personal appearance to registrants who had been reclassified pursuant to the 
delinquency regulations, but not to those who only had their inductions moved up. 
The apparent rationale for this latter distinction seemed to be that these rights at-
tached only to classification determinations and that "delinquency" was not a classifi-
cation. See J. GRIFFITHS, THE DRArT I.Aw, A "College Outline" for the Selective Ser-
vice Act rr Regulations 62 (2d ed. 1968). 
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changed. Since the delinquency regulations specifically authorized 
reopening for violations of selective service procedures, they had, in 
effect, carved out an express exception to the requirement of section 
1625.2 that reopening by the board be preceded by "facts not con-
sidered when the registrant was classified."197 However, the de-
linquency regulations appear to have been rendered inoperative and 
no longer constitute a valid basis for reopening or reclassification. 
As a result of this development, then, any reopening today by a local 
board without a prior finding of new facts can properly be termed 
arbitrary reopening. 
In light of Gutknecht and Pence, it seems unlikely that local 
boards will legally be able to resort to further punitive reclassifica-
tions under any of the regulations. The delinquency regulations have 
been declared void while the reopening regulations themselves pro-
hibit arbitrary and punitive reopening through the requirement of a 
finding of new facts. Furthermore, in nonpunitive situations in which 
the local board reconsiders a registrant's classification upon further 
reflection but without a prior finding of new facts, the arbitrary re-
opening rule should continue to afford him a measure of protection. 
B. Regulation 1625.2 and Claims Raised or Maturing After 
Issuance of a Work or Induction Order 
Once a work or induction order is mailed to a registrant, section 
1625.2 of the regulations prohibits reopening "unless the board first 
specifically finds that there has been a change in the registrant's sta-
tus resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no 
control."108 Thus, in attempting to ensure the efficient and orderly 
operation of the selective service process,109 this regulation renders 
the local board powerless to reopen after issuance of an order when 
the change in status after the induction order change has been mailed 
197. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
198. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971) provides in pertinent part that 
the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the local board has 
mailed to ••. registrant an Order to Report for Induction ••• or an Order to 
Report for Civilian Work and Statement of Employer ••• unless the local board 
first specifically finds that there has been a change in the registrant's status re-
sulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control. 
One court has held that once the time for induction has passed, however, 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1642.41(a) (1971) rather than 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971) governs the local board's ac-
tions and that the former section does not empower a board to reopen under any cir-
cumstances. United States v. Hart, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3379 (9th Cir. 1970). Contra, 
United States v. Stoppelman, 406 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1969), in which the court held 
that a board may consider a post-induction request for reopening although it does 
not have to do so. 
199. The regulations do not specifically state that the rationale for denying re-
opening after an induction order is mailed rests on efficiency and orderliness of ad-
ministration but the courts have concluded that this is the case. See Ehlert v. United 
States, 422 F.2d 332, 334 (9th Cir. 1970) (en bane), affd., 39 U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. April 
21, 1971). 
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is voluntary, or when the registrant has failed to raise a claim-
which in fact existed before he received that order-until after re-
ceiving his work or induction order.200 In this latter situation, the 
courts have held that the registrant waives his right to a deferment 
or exemption if he does not raise the question before issuance of the 
order.201 
The regulations do not ignore the fact that a change in a regis-
trant's status may occur after the board mails an order. Thus, they 
allow a post-induction order claim to be raised if the change that oc-
curs is beyond the registrant's control.202 For example, a registrant 
whose father dies after an induction order has been issued would 
undergo a change in status beyond his control, and, accordingly, the 
board could properly reopen to consider a hardship claim.203 
I. Impact on the De Facto Reopening and 
Prima Facie Case Rules 
Section 1625.2 directly influences the application of the de facto 
reopening and prima facie case rules in post-induction order settings. 
Two basic issues arise. First, can there be reopening in fact once an 
200. This interpretation of the regulation has been generally adopted by the courts. 
See, e.g., Porter v. United States, 334 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Beaver, 
309 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Williams v. United 
States, 203 F.2d 85 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1003 (1953); United States 
v. Lemmon, 313 F. Supp. 737 (D. Md. 1970). However, at least two courts have inter• 
preted the regulation differently. In United States ex Tel. Vaccarino v. Officer of the 
Day, 305 F. Supp. 732, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court held that the regulations only 
require a change in circumstances beyond the registrant's control in order for the 
board to reopen and that they "do not, however, strictly state that the change in sta-
tus must occur after the issuance of the order." This court thus raised the issue 
whether the change in status required for a board to reopen after an order to report 
for induction has been issued means a change that occurs only after a mailing of the 
order or whether it also includes any change that occurred since the last classification. 
The Vaccarino distinction was rejected in United States v. Lemmon, 313 F. Supp. 737 
(D. Md. 1970) (registrant waived his right to a fatherhood claim by failing to notify 
his local board of the birth of a child prior to his order to report for induction) but 
was accepted in Lidster v. Sutherland, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3509 (W.D. Ky. 1970) (die• 
tum). 
201. See notes 255-85 infra and accompanying text. 
!!02. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
203. For cases defining what constitutes a change in status beyond the registrant's 
control, see Clark v. Commanding Officer, 427 F.2d 7 (3d Cir. 1970) (acceptance of a 
contract is not a change in status beyond the registrant's control); United States v. 
Sampson, 3 SEL. SERv. L. R.EP. 3056 (4th Cir. 1970), United States v. Bittinger, 422 F.2d 
1032 (4th Cir. 1969) (a change from a conscientious objector to a full-time minister 
may result from circumstances beyond the registrant's control); United States v. Wrob-
lewski, 432 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1970) (marriage or a wife's pregnancy is not a change in 
status beyond a registrant's control); Wright v. Local Bd. No. 105, 3 SEL. SERV. L. R.EP. 
3407 (D. Minn. 1970) (reopening required upon notice of pregnancy when diagnosis 
prior to induction order was impossible). Whether the crystallization of a person's 
beliefs as a conscientious objector after he has received his induction order will 
satisfy § 1625.2 and thus permit reopening by the local board is considered at notes 
286-303 infra and accompanying text. 
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induction order has been mailed? And second, what showing must a 
registrant make to establish a prima facie claim once his board has 
ordered him to report for induction? The courts have been called 
upon to answer these questions, and their responses, while not unan-
imous, have effected several significant changes-at least in the post-
induction order setting-in the de facto reopening and prima facie 
case rules. 
Before proceeding to any analysis of these changes, it should be 
noted that the particular problems that have arisen with respect to 
conscientious objection and section 1625.2 have been rendered moot 
by the Supreme Court's holding in Ehlert v. United States204 that 
the late crystallization of a person's beliefs as a conscientious 
objector, even if an involuntary process, does not constitute the 
"objectively identifiable" change in status envisioned by section 
1625.2.205 The effect of this holding is to preclude any further re-
opening and reclassifying of registrants claiming to be conscientious 
objectors subsequent to the issuance of an induction order in those 
jurisdictions that have previously held crystallization to be an in-
voluntary process which satisfies the regulation. If the registrant 
claims that his beliefs crystallized after issuance of the order, his 
change in status, as interpreted by the Court and the Selective Ser-
vice System, would fail to satisfy the "objectively identifiable" in-
voluntary change in status that section 1625.2 establishes as a 
condition precedent to post-induction order reopening. And, if the 
registrant claims that his conscientious objection arose before he 
was mailed an induction order, there would be no post-induction 
order change in status to satisfy the regulations and any claim would 
thus be deemed to have been waived. 
Nevertheless, while the practical problems of conscientious ob-
jection can no longer arise in the post-induction order setting, it ap-
pears that they may have influenced, at least implicitly, the decisions 
of those courts that have rejected the prima facie case rule and the 
concept of de facto reopening in this setting, especially since such a 
large number of these claims were raised before the Court's decision 
in Ehlert. Thus, even though these issues are now moot with respect 
to conscientious objection, a better understanding of the various de-
cisions and, a fortiori, the general subject of post-induction order re-
opening apart from conscientious objection may be facilitated by 
examining at appropriate points in the discussion the problems of 
conscientious objection. This examination may aid in ascertaining, 
first, whether problems of conscientious objection have been the un-
articulated, and perhaps dominant, reasons for rejection of post-in-
duction order application of the prima facie case rule and de facto 
204. 39 U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. April 21, 1971). 
205. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455. See notes 294-303 infra and accompanying text. 
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reopening, and, second, whether the courts that have rejected these 
doctrines might be willing to reassess their positions in light of the 
fact that the problems generated by post-induction order conscien-
tious objector claims can no longer occur. 
a. Effect on De Facto Reopening. Under the de facto reopening 
rule formulated in Miller and Mulloy, a local board that crosses the 
boundary between the reopening decision and the reclassification 
decision, and thus inquires into the merits of a registrant's claim 
without first reopening, is deemed to have reopened in fact.206 How-
ever, in the post-induction order setting, section 1625.2 complicates 
the application of this rule. Under that regulation, a board that re-
opens after it has sent the registrant an induction order must first 
find that the registrant has undergone an involuntary change in sta-
tus since the mailing of that order.207 This inquiry into when and 
how the change in status arose often involves an investigation of the 
merits of the claim because the time a claim arises and its origins 
may be indicative of the merits, especially in cases of conscientious 
objection.208 Thus, the courts have necessarily had to face the task 
of accommodating the de facto reopening rule, which forbids an in-
quiry into the merits of a claim without first reopening, and section 
1625.2, which forbids post-induction order reopening without a prior 
investigation of one aspect of the merits of the claim, i.e., the time 
and source of its origin. 
The courts that have been presented with this problem have ap-
proached it in two different ways. On the one hand, the Second and 
Third Circuits have completely rejected the possibility of post-in-
duction order de facto reopening.209 These courts have reasoned 
that, because section 1625.2 specifically authorizes the local board 
to find that the change in status has arisen after the induction order 
due to circumstances beyond the registrant's control, the board may 
delve into the merits of the claim without committing the de facto 
reopening abuse. For example, in Scott v. Volatile,210 the registrant's 
local board mailed him a conscientious objector form and also 
granted him a courtesy interview after he had raised a claim of con-
scientious objection subsequent to receiving his induction order. 
The Third Circuit held that the de facto reopening rule of Mulloy 
206. See notes ll6-36 supra and accompanying text. 
207. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). 
208. See, e.g., Kurjan v. Commanding Officer, 314 F. Supp. 213, 221 (E.D. Pa. 1970), 
in which the court noted that "to determine if there has been a change in status 
necessarily requires an inquiry into the merits of the claim." 
209. Ferrell v. Local Bd. No. 38, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3395 (2d Cir. 1970); Paszel 
v. Laird, 426 F.2d ll69 (2d Cir. 1970); Scott v. Volatile, 313 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa.), 
revd. on other grounds sub nom. Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d ll32 (3d Cir. 
1970); Lane v. Local Bd. No. 17, 315 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1970). 
210. 313 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Pa.), revd. on other grounds sub nom. Scott v. Com-
manding Officer, 431 F.2d ll32 (3d Cir. 1970). 
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was totally inapplicable in post-induction order situations and thus 
upheld the district court's ruling· that characterized the courtesy 
hearing and investigation into the merits of the claim as "a perfectly 
proper method of fulfilling the obligation imposed by the regula-
tion."211 In other words, the court ruled that the board's duty to 
find an involuntary change in status before it reopened authorized 
an investigation of the merits of the claim, notwithstanding the de 
facto reopening rule.212 Thus, the court strictly confined the de facto 
reopening rule to the preinduction order setting. 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit213 and several federal 
district courts214 have adopted a different position in their attempts 
to accommodate the de facto reopening rule and section 1625.2. 
They reject the notion that de facto reopening applies only to the 
investigation of claims raised prior to the mailing of an induction 
order and recognize that de facto reopening can have a limited, but 
nevertheless important, application in post-induction order situa-
tions. These courts hold that the threshold question whether there 
has been an involuntary change in status occurring after the mail-
ing of the induction order can be separated from a determination 
of the over-all merits of the claim.215 Under this approach, while 
activities related to answering the threshold question do not consti-
tute de facto reopening, activities that proceed beyond determining 
the answer to this question, and thereby constitute an evaluation of 
the merits, run afoul of Mulloy's prohibition of de facto reopen-
ing.210 
211. 313 F. Supp. at 195. 
212. However, when the State Director orders reopening of a registrant's classifica-
tion after the registrant has been ordered to report for induction, the local board 
does not have to find an involuntary change in the registrant's status to reopen. See 
note 255 infra. Thus, the Third Circuit has held that investigation of the merits of 
a registrant's claim, when such investigation is not necessary to satisfy 32 C.F.R. § 
1625.2 (1971), will constitute de facto reopening. United States v. Noonan, 3 SEL. SERv. 
L. REP. 3519 (3d Cir. 1970). 
213. United States v. Nordlof, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3546 (7th Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Garvin, 3 SEL. SEilv. L. REP. 3699 (7th Cir. 1971). 
214. Lubben v. Local Bd. No. 27, 316 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1970); Kutjan v. Com-
manding Officer, 314 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Young, ll SEL. SERv. 
L. REP. 3381 (D. Minn. 1970); Murray v. Blatchford, 207 F. Supp. 1038, motion to dis-
miss denied sub nom. Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688 (D.R.I. 1969). 
215. One court has even held that a mere courtesy interview granted after an order 
to report for induction has been mailed constitutes de facto reopening, notwithstand-
ing the requirement of 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971) that the board must specifically find 
an involuntary change in status. United States v. Westphal, 304 F. Supp. 951 (D.S.D. 
1969). 
216. Furthermore, it appears that if a board makes an evaluative determination 
of the merits of the registrant's claim after it has issued an induction order but re-
fuses to reopen, the de facto reopening will fall within the Oestereich exception and 
thus be subject to preinduction judicial review. Rhem v. Local Bd. No. 104, 3 SEL. 
SERV. L. REP. 3437 (W.D. Wis. 1970). 
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In Kurjan v. Commanding Officer,211 the registrant sought re-
opening and a II-A occupational deferment after he had received an 
induction order. His board granted him a personal appearance at 
which he indicated that his status had changed from that of a gradu-
ate trainee to a full-time salaried research assistant working on a 
project for the Electronics Command of the United States Army. 
After the personal appearance, the board directed its activities to de-
termining whether Kurjan's endeavors were "essential."218 These 
activities included a request to the State Board for a "decision 
or ruling," two requests for opinions of the registrant's work from 
the State Scientific Advisory Committee, two separate mailings of 
Occupational Inquiry Forms to the University of Pennsylvania, and 
a final board evaluation of the claim at which the II-A classification 
was denied. None of the activities were directed at finding whether 
the change in the registrant's status occurred after the induction or-
der was mailed or whether the change was beyond the registrant's 
control. Instead, they were clearly designed to aid the board in de-
termining the merits of the claim-that is, whether the new occu-
pation was essential. The District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania noted that "to determine if there has been a change 
in status necessarily requires an inquiry into the merits of the 
claim,"219 but the court nevertheless held that the board in fact re-
opened, first, when it continued its investigation after it had become 
aware of the fact that the change in status had occurred subsequent 
to the mailing of the induction order and, second, when it failed to 
direct its investigation toward a determination of the voluntariness 
of the change. 220 
In Lubben v. Local Board Number 27,221 a registrant sought re-
217. 314 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
218. 32 C.F.R. § 1622.22(a) (1970), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11527, 32 C.F.R. § 
1622,22(a) (1971), provided: "In Class II-A shall be placed any registrant whose oc-
cupation ••• or • • • employment • • • or whose activity in research, or medical, 
scientific, or others deavors [sic] is found to be necessary to the maintenance of the 
national health, safety, or interest." 32 C.F.R. § 1622.22(b) (1970), as amended, Exec. 
Order No. 11527, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.22(b) (1971), provided: "In Class II-A shall be 
placed any registrant who is preparing for critical skills and other essential occupations 
as identified by the Director of Selective Service upon the advice of the National 
Security Council." 
219. 314 F. Supp. at 221. 
220. The court held: 
Where, as here, the Local Board is found to have exceeded its duties and, on its 
own motion, to have extensively investigated the petitioner's claim, we do not 
think that the Board's ultimate decision on the merits of the claim should be 
insulated from administrative review by merely calling it a "refusal to reopen." 
Cutting through form, the substance of the Board's actions qualifies as de facto 
reopening of the classification ••. from which the registrant was entitled to an 
appeal (as well as a personal appearance) under 32 C.F.R. § 1625.13. 
!!14 F. Supp. at 222. 
221. 316 F. Supp. 2!10 (D. Mass. 1970). 
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opening and a change of classification from I-A to I-0 (conscientious 
objector) after he received his induction order. His local board 
mailed him a form for conscientious objectors, postponed his induc-
tion, and granted him a courtesy interview, but subsequently refused 
to reopen. The District Court for the District of Massachusetts, while 
recognizing that section 1625.2 authorizes an inquiry into when and 
how the claim arose, interpreted the board's statement that the reg-
istrant "recently became aware of his possible conscientious objector 
classification after receipt of his induction order" as "an inept state-
ment by the board" that the change was beyond the registrant's con-
trol and that section 1625.2 had been satisfied.222 However, the court 
also noted that the board had proceeded beyond the threshold ques-
tion when it made "an evaluative determination" of the conscien-
tious objection claim after it had expressly found that the change in 
status arose involuntarily and subsequent to the issuance of the in-
duction order. According to the court in Lubben, this "evaluative 
determination" after the finding of an involuntary change in the 
registrant's status constituted de facto reopening.223 
Similarly, in United States v. Young,224 the District Court for the 
District of Minnesota distinguished a "consideration" of the merits, 
which is inherent in the threshold question, from "deciding" the 
merits without reopening.225 The court then ruled that Mulloy pro-
hibits only the latter. 
Thus, while the courts that take this second approach allow the 
local board to evaluate the threshold question and engage in activi-
ties aimed at answering it,226 they recognize that there exists a point 
at which the investigation may become so extensive that the de facto 
reopening rule should apply. However, because these courts have 
also recognized that the threshold question necessarily involves a 
degree of consideration of the merits of the claim, problems inevi-
222. 316 F. Supp. at 232. 
223. The court recognized that Lane v. Local Bd. No. 17, 315 F. Supp. 1355 (D. 
Mass. 1970), in which another judge of the same district had rejected the registrant's 
contention of de facto reopening, was "factually on all fours" with the present case. 
However, the court felt that "the response of the board in the instant case more clearly 
establishes .•. an 'evaluative determination' of the registrant's claim ••• was made 
by the board subsequent to the personal appearance of the petitioner." 316 F. Supp. 
at 231 (emphasis added). 
224. 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3381 (D. Minn. 1970). 
225. The court noted that 
a distinction must be drawn between the Board having before it and possibly con-
sidering the merits of the claim on the one hand, and the Board actually decid-
ing the merits on the other. The former need not result in prejudice to the 
registrant while the latter may well have such a result. 
3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. at 3383. The court failed to explain precisely, however, the differ-
ence between considering the merits and deciding them. 
226. See, e.g., Garrell v. Volatile, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3606 (E.D. Pa. 1970), in which 
the board's investigation of a post-induction order hardship claim was held not a de 
facto reopening since its activities were directed toward the threshold question. 
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tably arise in defining and drawing the line between permissible ac-
tivities directed toward answering the threshold question and 
those directed toward an evaluation of the over-all merits. In 
Kurjan, it was possible for the board to answer the threshold ques-
tion-whether there had been an involuntary change in status-
without having to proceed to the merits-that is, whether the new 
position was essential to the security of the country. Therefore, the 
board's extensive investigation of the merits of the II-A claim after 
it had found that the registrant's status had changed from a gradu-
ate trainee to a salaried employee, clearly constituted de facto re-
opening. In this situation, application of the conceptual difference 
between permissible and impermissible activities presented only 
minor problems because the threshold activities were, for the most 
part, mutually exclusive of those directed toward the merits. 
However, when claims of conscientious objection are in issue 
(and as a result of Ehlert, such claims can no longer arise after an 
induction order has been mailed), the better rule would appear to be 
that section 1625.2 precludes the application of the de facto reopen-
ing rule after an induction order has been mailed. When claims of 
conscientious objection are involved, investigation of the threshold 
question is necessarily tied to the merits because the time of origin 
of the claim and its voluntariness often relate closely to whether the 
registrant is truly a conscientious objector. When a post-induction 
order claim of conscientious objection arises, the board is charged 
with the duty of ascertaining whether and when the registrant has 
undergone an involuntary change in status that will support a re-
opening. Yet, in determining whether or not there has been an in-
voluntary change in status, the board must find that the registrant 
has become a conscientious objector. If he has not become a con-
scientious objector-that is, if his mental state has not changed-
there will not have been a change in status that will satisfy section 
1625.2. In other words, if he has not become a conscientious objector, 
there has been no change. Certainly the unsupported statements of 
the registrant cannot be the involuntary change envisioned by the 
regulations. Thus, in answering the threshold question, it is clear 
that the board must also delve into the merits and ascertain whether 
a valid claim exists. Moreover, if the board, in answering the thres-
hold question, finds that there has been a change in status, it has 
also and necessarily determined the merits of the claim. 
The essential differences between conscientious objection reopen-
ing requests and others, such as hardship or occupational reopening 
requests, are obvious. In cases involving the latter there is some ob-
jective manifestation of the change in status that remains separate 
from the merits. For example, a person's job may change due to cir-
cumstances beyond his control or his father may die after he receives 
his induction order. These involuntary changes, upon being sub-
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stantiated by the board, would satisfy the requirements of section 
1625.2 and justify a decision by the board to reopen. However, in a 
case in which the registrant's job has changed, the question whether 
the new job can be termed essential or necessary to the nation's 
well-being and thus supportive of the II-A occupational deferment 
would remain unanswered.227 In the case of the registrant whose 
father dies, the question whether the death has caused a hardship 
within the meaning of the III-A hardship deferment would still re-
quire an answer.228 In these situations, then, room exists for the ap-
plication of the de facto reopening rule, and, if after investigating 
the threshold question and finding an involuntary change in status, 
the board considers the merits (e.g., whether the job is essential or 
whether there is a hardship), it can properly be said to have reopened 
in fact. 
On the other hand, there is no outward, objective manifestation 
of a change in status in cases in which a claim of conscientious ob-
jection is raised.229 The changes that occur, if they do occur, are 
mental and not independently ascertainable. The threshold ques-
tion thus becomes merged into the merits because the registrant can-
not be said to have undergone any change whatsoever without first 
having become a true conscientious objector. Few courts seem to 
have recognized this problem,230 and as a result some courts have 
held that even in cases involving a claim of conscientious objection 
a separable threshold question exists.231 Yet, these latter courts have 
failed to explain how the board may find a change in status without 
first finding that a valid claim exists. Thus, until Ehlert eliminated 
the possibility of post-induction order reopening when conscientious 
227. See note 218 supra and accompanying text. 
228. See note 167 supra. 
229. The Supreme Court has acknowledged this in Ehlert v. United States, 39 U.S. 
L.W. 4453 (U.S. April 21, 1971). 
230. The Second Circuit in Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970), and the 
Third Circuit in Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970), seem to 
have recognized the merger of the threshold question and the merits of the claim 
when conscientious objection is involved. In Scott, the court "concluded that the regu-
lations required the local board to decide the merits of petitioner's conscientious ob-
jector claim as a part of its decision whether to reopen." 431 F.2d at 1134. 
231. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3381 (D. Minn. 1970); 
Lubben v. Local Bd. No. 27, 316 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1970). In Young, the court 
found that de facto reopening had not occurred. The fact that the board granted the 
registrant a personal appearance was not construed by the court as de facto reopening 
since the appearance was directed to answering the threshold question. The court also 
held that the registrant's allegations failed to show that his beliefs matured after he 
received his induction order and thus the denial of reopening was proper, 3 SEL. SERV, 
L. REP. at 3384. In Lubben, the board was ordered to reopen and ascertain the merits 
of the claim. Of course since the board's de facto reopening had already resulted in a 
judgment of the claim, the court-ordered reopening would merely be a reaffirmation 
of the prior decision. However, the registrant would have the right of appeal after 
this reopening. 
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objection claims are raised, this area remained in a somewhat un-
settled state. 
The Second and Third Circuits, while expressly relying on a 
strict interpretation of the regulation, may have at least implicitly 
rejected post-induction order de facto reopening with the practical 
consideration of conscientious objection cases in mind, especially 
since such a large number of these claims have been raised in the 
past. However, since post-induction order claims of conscientious 
objection are now precluded, the de facto reopening concept can be 
applied practically since the threshold question and permissible ac-
tivities directed toward that question generally can be separated 
from activities directed toward the merits in those cases in which a 
claim of conscientious objection is not involved.232 In light of Ehlert 
and the implications of that decision, it would thus appear that the 
approach of the Seventh Circuit and several district courts-one 
which accommodates de facto reopening principles with -the mandate 
of regulation 1625.2, rather than rejecting post-induction order de 
facto reopening altogether-represents the conceptually sounder 
and therefore better rule. Since the conceptual problems that neces-
sarily arise in attempting to accommodate conscientious objection, de 
facto reopening, and section 1625.2 are now precluded from arising, 
the major justification for not applying de facto reopening princi-
ples once the registrant has received an induction order has been 
eliminated. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the Second and 
Third Circuits, after reflecting upon the Ehlert decision and its re-
moval of conscientious objection from the post-induction order set-
ting, may re-examine their positions and thus apply Mulloy and its 
prohibitions against de facto reopening to local-board evaluation of 
the merits of a registrant's claim, even if the local board has already 
issued an induction order to the registrant. 
b. Effect on the Prima Facie Case Rule. In Mulloy v. United 
States,233 the Supreme Court recognized the prima fade case rule 
and held that a local board must reopen a registrant's classification 
when he submits facts that would support a decision to reclassify 
him if later proved true. However, Mulloy was rendered in the con-
text of a preinduction order claim for a new classification. Thus, 
when post-induction order claims for reopening and new classifica-
tions arise, the impact of section 1625.2 and its requirement that 
post-induction order reopening be preceded by an involuntary 
change in status must be accommodated in applying the prima fade 
case rule. As in the case of post-induction order de facto reopening, 
the question of how this accommodation should be made has com-
2!12. See text following note 225 supra. 
2l!l!. l!98 U.S. 410 {1970). See notes 1!!7-61 supra and accompanying text. 
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plicated the application of the general rule and has caused the courts 
to separate into two distinct and conflicting positions. 
The Seventh and Tenth Circuits and several district courts ap-
ply the prima fade case rule after an induction order has been is-
sued, although the elements of the rule are somewhat altered in this 
setting.234 According to these courts a post-induction order prima 
facie showing includes: (1) the usual submission of facts that would 
justify a new classification if subsequently proved true and (2) addi-
tional allegations that an involuntary change in status occurred after 
issuance of the registrant's induction order.235 When the registrant 
makes this dual showing, the board has the affirmative duty to as-
certain when the change in status arose and whether or not it was 
voluntary.236 If, after investigation of this threshold question, the 
board finds an involuntary change in status that satisfies section 
1625.2, it must then reopen and make the actual reclassification de-
cision.237 If the board purports to make a further evaluation without 
expressly reopening, it will be deemed to have reopened in fact.238 
However, should the board deny a post-induction order claim when 
the registrant has submitted facts that would normally support a 
new classification if proved true, it must make a specific finding that 
there has been no change beyond the registrant's control that might 
satisfy the requirements of section 1625.2.239 A failure to make this 
234. United States v. Nordlof, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3546 (7th Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Garvin, 3 SEL SERV. L. REP. 3698 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Brown 
v. Resor, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3188 (10th Cir. 1970); Lane v. Local Bd. No. 17, 315 F. 
Supp. 1355 (D. Mass 1970); Lubben v. Local Bd. No. 27, 316 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 
1970); United States v. Young, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3381 (D. Minn. 1970); Rhem v. 
Local Bd. No. 104, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3437 (W.D. Wis. 1970). 
235. In United States ex rel. Brown v. Resor, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3188 (10th Cir. 
1970), the court held that 
to be granted a reopening under the regulation the registrant must not only pre-
sent facts which, if true, would justify his classification as a conscientious objector 
but must also make prima facie allegations establishing the post-induction order 
crystallization of those beliefs. As mandated by the exacting language of the reg-
ulation, the board must "specifically find" that the newly sought classification is 
founded in these n110 elements; only then does the regulation contemplate a re• 
opening of the classification. 
3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. at 3188. 
236. See note 235 supra. 
237. See, e.g., Lubben v. Local Bd. No. 27, 316 F. Supp. 230 (D. Mass. 1970) and 
cases cited in note 234 supra. In Lane v. Local Bd. No. 17, 315 F. Supp. 1355, 1359 
(D. Mass. 1970), the court held: "Once the reopening is justified then there is nothing 
to distinguish a request for reopening made prior to the notice of induction and one 
made after the notice. There is therefore no reason for failing to apply the rationale 
of .•• [the prima facie case] to both situations." 
238. See notes 213-14 supra. 
239. United States ex rel. Brown v. Resor, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3188 (10th Cir. 1970); 
United States v. Pacheco, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3384 (10th Cir. 1970); Spencer v. Brad-
ley, 3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. 3444 (W .D. Mo. 1970); Warwich v. Volatile, 3 SEL. SERV. L. 
REP. 3597 (E.D. Pa. 1970). In Brown, the court noted: 
A reopening of a classification after issuance of an induction order absent specific 
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finding will-at least in the Seventh and Tenth Circuits-invalidate 
a previously issued induction order.240 In summary, it appears that 
this first group of courts has established a finding of an involuntary 
change in status as a condition precedent to application of the prima 
facie case rule in the post-induction order setting. Without this es-
sential finding by the board, these courts will not apply the prima 
facie case rule. "\'\Tith the addition of the required finding, the rule 
is applied in exactly the same manner as it is applied in the pre-
induction order setting. And, in any case, regardless of whether the 
board reopens, it appears that it must always ascertain whether or 
not an involuntary change in status has arisen after the issuance of 
the induction order. 
The Second and Third Circuits have taken a different approach 
than the Seventh and Tenth Circuits and have held that post-induc-
tion order application of the prima facie case rule is inappropriate, 
at least when claims of conscientious objection are at issue and pos-
sibly when any claim has been raised.241 In Paszel v. Laird,242 the 
Second Circuit stated that "[s]ection 1625.2 cannot be read as man-
dating reopening when there has been only a prima facie showing 
in the case of requests made after notice of induction . . .''243 and 
then held that reopening in post-induction order situations can only 
be had after the registrant's claim is evaluated by the board and is 
found to justify a new classification. Under this approach, the board 
remains legally free to evaluate the claim to find whether there has 
been an involuntary change in status and also to ascertain the merits. 
The board may reopen and reclassify the registrant if the claim for 
a new classification proves to be worthy. But, if the claim fails to 
stand up under the board's investigation or if this investigation 
shows that the claim arose prior to induction, the board may prop-
erly refuse to reopen. Moreover, since these same courts generally 
refuse to apply the de facto reopening rule in the post-induction or-
affirmative findings satisfying .•• [the involuntary change in status requirement] 
would not be in accord with the regulations. A refusal to reopen absent findings 
which negative these prerequisites necessarily shares the same defect. 
3 SEL. SERV. L. REP. at 3188. Furthermore, it appears that if the board fails to ascer-
tain when the change in status arose or whether the registrant has presented a prima 
facie case, preinduction review will be available, even in cases of conscientious ob-
jection. Lane v. Local Bd. No. 17, 315 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1970). 
240. See note 239 supra. 
241. Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); Ferrell v. Local Bd. No. 38, 3 
Su. SERV. L. REP. 3395 (2d Cir. 1970); Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d 
Cir. 1970). These courts have not faced the issue of whether the prima facie rule would 
be applied to claims other than conscientious objection in the post-induction order 
setting. 
242. 426 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970). 
243. 426 F.2d at 1173-74. 
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der setting, investigation of the merits will not be deemed to be re-
opening in fact.244 
Under this second approach, then, the board must reopen only 
when reclassification is justified; hence, reclassification will inevi-
tably follow reopening.245 Furthermore, a board's refusal to reopen 
in these circumstances is treated like any other refusal to reopen and 
thus " a registrant will not have the right to a personal appearance 
or appeal and will be left only with judicial review of the refusal to 
reopen, in accordance with the narrow scope generally prevailing 
in selective service cases."246 Moreover, in Ferrell v. Local Board 
Number 38,247 the Second Circuit held that this "narrow scope" of 
judicial review does not include preinduction review since the 
board's evaluation of the facts comprising the claim of conscientious 
objection and its exercise of discretion cannot come within the 
Oestereich exception to section 10(b)(3). 
Unlike the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the Second and Third 
Circuits have not expressed a view on the issue whether the board 
has an affirmative duty to take any action on a post-induction order 
claim. However, this duty may fairly be implied from a plain read-
ing of the provisions of section 1625.2, which require the board 
specifically to find an involuntary change in the registrant's status 
before reopening, and from the preinduction order cases which hold 
that a board must consider new facts submitted to it. Thus, it is un-
likely that either the Second or Third Circuit would hold that the 
board has no duty to reopen and reclassify a registrant with a valid 
claim merely because the claim arose and the registrant presented 
it after he received his induction order. Rather, it would appear that 
these courts would hold that whereas there is an absolute duty to 
evaluate the claim, there is no duty to reopen unless it is valid. The 
Third Circuit has ruled, however, that before such a duty arises the 
registrant must first present a "prima facie case showing of entitle-
ment to a new classification."248 While this prima facie showing may 
244. See notes 209-12 supra and accompanying text. 
245. In Paszel v. Laird, 426 F.2d 1169, 1174 (2d Cir. 1970), Judge Friendly noted 
that "where the alleged change in status is a newly CT)'Stallized conscientious objec-
tion, a decision to reopen will necessarily lead to a decision to reclassify in the ab-
sence of new evidence reflecting adversely on the claim • • • ." 
246. 426 F.2d at 1174. 
247. 3 SEL. S.£Rv. L. REP. 3395 (2d Cir. 1970). 
248. Scott v. Commanding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970). The court estab-
lished the following requirements for a post-induction order prima fade case: 
Before the local board may reopen after an induction order has been issued there 
must be (1) a prima facie showing of entitlement to a new classification; (2) a spe-
cific finding of a "change in the registrant's status" since the induction order; 
and (3) a specific finding that this change resulted from circumstances over which 
the registrant had no control. Thus, a local board's denial of a post-induction-
order reopening claim cannot generally be upset on judicial review if the court 
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be a condition precedent to the board's duty to take action on the 
claim, it will clearly not entitle the registrant to reopening and the 
procedural consequences of personal appearance and appeal that are 
associated with the preinduction order prima fade showing.249 
Since the great majority of post-induction order reopening cases 
prior to Ehlert involved claims of conscientious objection, it appears 
the Second and Third Circuits fashioned the better rule-that both 
the prima fade case rule and the de facto reopening rule do not ap-
ply once the board issues an induction order. As noted earlier, when 
claims of conscientious objection are raised after the mailing of an 
induction order, the local boards subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Seventh and Tenth Circuits face the impossible task of separating 
the threshold question from the merits of the claim and then direct-
ing their activities accordingly. It was concluded that post-induction 
order de facto reopening is inappropriate when conscientious ob-
jection claims are at issue since the separation of the merits from 
the threshold question is conceptually impossible.2150 Moreover, ap-
plication of these same considerations leads to the conclusion that 
the prima fade case rule, even as modified by the Seventh and 
Tenth Circuits, also can have no meaningful or practical application 
when post-induction order conscientious objection claims are at is-
sue. 
Following the approach of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, it 
appears that when the registrant presents new facts that would jus-
tify a conscientious objector classification the board has an affirma-
tive duty to determine whether there has been an involuntary change 
in status that occurred after the registrant received his induction 
order.251 I£ the board finds the required change, it must reopen.252 
However, as noted above,253 in ascertaining whether there has been 
a change in status that will empower it to reopen, the board must 
necessarily decide the merits-that is, whether the registrant has be-
come a conscientious objector. Once the board finds the requisite 
involuntary change in status that will support a reopening, it has 
necessarily determined the merits favorably toward registrant, and 
reclassification should inevitably ensue. Thus, it is logically difficult, 
if not impossible, to conclude that there can be a prima fade case of 
conscientious objection after a prior finding of a change in status. 
determines that no prima facie case for a new classification was made out, or 
that a negative board finding on (2) and/or (3) above had a basis in fact. 
431 F.2d at 1135. 
249. See notes 25-32 supra and accompanying text. 
250. See text following note 225 supra. 
251. See notes 239-40 supra and accompanying text. 
252. See notes 234-40 supra and accompanying text. 
253. See text accompanying note 250 supra. 
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The Second Circuit seems to have recognized the existence of 
the merger between the threshold question and the merits of the 
conscientious objector claim and thus has allowed reopening only 
when the claim is valid.254 If the claim is found to be invalid, the 
court would acknowledge that no change in status ever occurred 
and thus would allow the board to refuse reopening, unencumbered 
and unrestrained by doctrines that make little sense in light of the 
nature of conscientious objection and the requirements of section 
1625.2. 
However, as in the case of de facto reopening, Ehlert has elimi-
nated the problem of accommodating conscientious objection, the 
prima facie rule, and section 1625.2. Thus, the modified prima facie 
rule of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits-holding that allegations 
that an involuntary change in status has occurred must accompany 
the usual prima fade case allegations-becomes workable. If the 
board finds that an involuntary change in status has occurred sub-
sequent to the issuance of an induction order in a nonconscientious 
objection case, the merits of the claim will still remain. And if a 
prima facie claim has been presented, the rationale and reasoning 
of Miller and Mulloy would appear to be fully applicable despite 
the fact that the board has issued an induction order. Thus, it is sub-
mitted that the board should have the affirmative duty to reopen 
and evaluate the claim on its merits, thereby affording the registrant 
the procedural consequences associated with reopening. Since this is 
the approach followed by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, these 
courts appear to have fashioned the better rule. Hopefully, the Sec-
ond and Third Circuits, whose rejection of the prima facie case in 
the post-induction setting was logical when the problems encoun-
tered in cases of conscientious objection were factors to consider, 
will reconsider their positions in light of Ehlert. 
2. Conscientious Objection and Regulation 1625.2 
One of the most heavily litigated areas of Selective Service law 
today is that involving the right to the conscientious objector ex-
emption and the relationship of that right to section 1625.2 of the 
regulations. This litigation appears to be fostered by the inherent 
difficulty encountered by a board in gauging the crystallization of 
an individual's beliefs as a conscientious objector and also by the 
preferred status Congress has apparently given conscientious ob-
jectors. The problems with respect to conscientious objection and 
section 1625.2 frequently arise in one of two distinct situations: 
(1) When the claim of conscientious objection is made after 
254. See note 230 supra. 
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issuance of an induction order but when it appears that 
the registrant's beliefs arose before that issuance. 
(2) 'When the claim of conscientious objection is made after 
issuance of an induction order and the registrant claims 
that his beliefs crystallized after he received that order. 
Each of these two situations, in turn, generates a separate legal 
issue. The first issue concerns the question whether the regulations 
can take away a congressionally authorized exemption. In other 
words, can the regulations require the registrant either to raise his 
claim of conscientious objection at a particular time or lose the right 
to raise it, especially when Congress has expressly authorized that 
particular military status? At stake in the determination of this is-
sue is the validity and legality of section 1625.2. 
The second issue involves a determination whether the crystalli-
zation of a person's beliefs as a conscientious objector is a circum-
stance beyond his control which will empower a local board to 
reopen after mailing an induction order. This issue can be broken 
down into two subissues. First, whether crystallization is beyond a 
person's control, and, second, even if it is beyond his control, can it 
be deemed a "circumstance" within the meaning of the regulations? 
a. Is Regulation 1625.2 Valid and Lawful? In the situation in 
which a registrant's beliefs as a conscientious objector arise long be-
fore his local board orders him to report for induction but he never-
theless waits until after receiving that order to submit a request for 
reopening, section 1625.2 clearly cuts off the right to raise any claim 
of conscientious objection that crystallized before the induction or-
der was mailed. Unless the board finds that "there has been a change 
in the registrant's status resulting from circumstances over which the 
registrant had no control," section 1625.2 renders it powerless to re-
open.21,r; 
While section 1625.2 purports to cut off any rights a conscien-
255. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 (1971). However, at least one court has recognized that, 
notwithstanding § 1625.2, the State Director or the National Director of Selective 
Service can authorize reopening of a claim that arose before the induction order was 
mailed but not raised until after the mailing. Miller v. United States, 388 F.2d 973 
(9th Cir. 1967). In Miller the registrant obtained Selective Serv. Sys. Form 150 before 
he was ordered to report for induction but returned it two days after the order was 
mailed. His board refused to consider his request but was ordered to do so by the 
State Director. The local board again refused to reopen and subsequently Miller re-
fused induction and was convicted for that refusal. In reversing the conviction the 
court noted that there was no problem of late reopening because the exercise by the 
State Director of his power under § 1625.3(a) made § 1625.2 inapplicable. 32 C.F.R. 
§ 1625.!l(a) (1971) requires the board to reopen upon a request from either the State 
or National Director and also requires that outstanding work or induction orders be 
cancelled. However, if a local board reopens and grants a III-A hardship deferment 
after it has issued an induction order, a subsequent induction based on the advice of 
state headquarters that reopening is not warranted is invalid. Rochford v. Volatile, 
ll SEL. Snv. L. REP. 3478 (E.D. Pa. 1970). 
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tious objector may have to present his claim, section 456G) (fre-
quently referred to as section 6(j)) of the Act clearly states: 
Nothing contained in this title ... shall be construed to require any 
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed 
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and 
belie£, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any 
form.211s 
Although the Act expressly provides that nothing in the Act shall 
be construed to require combatant training and military service for 
conscientious objectors, nearly all courts, including the Supreme 
Court in Ehlert,251 have upheld the validity of section 1625.2 despite 
its seeming conflict with the statute.258 Even those courts that have 
expressed some disfavor with section 1625.2 have tried to deal with 
it by passing on the crystallization-of-beliefs issue259 rather than by 
questioning the validity of the regulation as applied to conscientious 
objectors.260 The major justification for upholding the regulation is 
found in section 460(b)(l) (commonly referred to as IO(b)(l)) of the 
Act, which authorizes the President "to prescribe the necessary rules 
and regulations to carry out the provisions of this title."261 Thus, the 
courts have held that the right to claim the conscientious objector 
exemption will be deemed to be waived if not raised within the time 
limit specified in the regulations.262 The waiver theory seems to have 
256. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 4560) (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968). 
257. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4456. 
258. See cases cited in note 286 infra. 
259. See notes 286-303 infra and accompanying text. 
260. See, e.g., United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1966), affd. on 
remand, 266 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 
959 (1967). 
261. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(l) (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968). 
262. Waiver can result in either of two ways. First, if a registrant fails to raise a 
claim that exists prior to the mailing of his induction order until after that mailing, 
his claim is deemed to be waived. (See cases cited in note 286 infra). In addition, 
waiver may occur if the registrant does not raise a claim within ten days after the 
time it arises. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.l(b) (1971). See Porter v. United States, 334 F.2d 792 (7th 
Cir. 1964); United States v. Beaver, 309 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
951 (1963); Williams v. United States, 203 F.2d 85 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 1003 
(1953); United States v. Lemmon, 313 F. Supp. 737 (D. Md. 1970) (waiver of right to 
raise fatherhood claim because of failure to notify local board of birth of child prior 
to induction order and within ten days from the time the facts arose). Contra, Vac-
carino v. Officer of the Day, 305 F. Supp. 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Vaccarino, the regis-
trant was permitted to raise a hardship claim after the order to report for induction 
and after ten days from the time the hardship arose. After noting the confused state 
of the registrant's plight, which involved a heart condition of the registrant's father, 
the court stated: "It would be unthinkable, and patently unjust, to hold that a regis-
trant waived so important a right by failing to comply with a procedural requirement 
of which he was unaware. The forfeiture of so important a right cannot rest on so 
trivial a ground." 305 F. Supp. at 737. 
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originated in United States v. Schoebel.263 In Schoebel, the registrant 
sought to raise a post-induction order claim of conscientious objec-
tion, but his local board refused to reopen. In upholding the regis-
trant's conviction for refusing induction, the court held that Schoe-
bel had waived or abandoned the right to claim an exemption. While 
Schoebel itself did not consider the conflict between the Act and 
section 1625.2 of the regulations, nearly all courts that have accepted 
the waiver theory have sought to justify that theory by reference to 
the statutory delegation of power to the President to prescribe neces-
sary rules and regulations. Furthermore, these courts have agreed not 
only "that the regulation is within the perimeter of the grant of 
power,"264 but also that without section 1625.2 "the manpower quotas 
of Selective Service could not be met with any degree of certainty."265 
The Supreme Court recently summarized the position of nearly all 
courts when it held that "[t]he System needs and has the power to 
make reasonable timeliness rules for the presentation of claims to 
exemption from service."266 
The Supreme Court's decision in Ehlert, accepting (although in 
dictum on this particular issue)267 the view that a claim that arises 
before the issuance of an induction order but that is not asserted 
until after receipt of that order is deemed waived, represents a 
marked departure from several of its most recent decisions. Until 
Ehlert it appeared that the validity of the waiver theory had been 
put in doubt in several recent Supreme Court cases, including 
Gutknecht268 and Oestereich269 and in a federal district court case, 
United States v. Eisdorfer,270 cited by the Supreme Court in 
Gutknecht. As noted earlier in this discussion,271 Gutknecht invali-
dated the delinquency regulations on the ground that they were un-
authorized by, and in conflict with, the Act. In considering the 
status of the delinquency regulations, the Court, quoting the 
Eisdorf er opinion, noted that "The delinquency regulations, more-
263. 201 F.2d 31 {7th Cir. 1953). The court held: "Deferment being a privilege, it 
may be abandoned like any other personal privilege." 201 F.2d at 32. But see the 
language of the Supreme Court in Gutknecht at text accompanying note 272 infra. 
264. Ehlert v. United States, 422 F.2d 332, 334 (9th Cir. 1970) (en bane), afjd., 39 
U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. April 21, 1971). 
265. 422 F.2d at 334. 
266. Ehlert v. United States, 39 U.S.L.W. 4453, 4454 (U.S. April 21, 1971). 
267. The Court faced the issue whether crystallization of a person's beliefs as a 
conscientious objector is a circumstance beyond the registrant's control. However, be-
fore passing on this issue, the Court noted that "the penalty of forfeiture" would be 
appropriate if a registrant with a claim existing before he received his induction 
order did not assert it until after receipt. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4454 n.4. 
268. 396 U.S. 295 (1970). 
269. 393 U.S. 223 (1968). 
270. 299 F. Supp. 975 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). 
271. See notes 191-94 supra and accompanying text. 
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over, disregard the structure of the Act; deferments and priorities-
of-induction, adopted in the public interest, are treated as if they 
were forfeitable personal privileges."272 The Court in Gutknecht 
also cited Oestereich: 
"There is no suggestion in the legislative history that, when Con-
gress has granted an exemption and a registrant meets its terms and 
conditions, a Board can nonetheless withhold it from him for activ-
ities or conduct not material to the grant or withdrawal of the ex-
emption. So to hold would make the Boards free-wheeling agencies 
meting out their brand of justice in a vindictive manner. 
"Once a person registers and qualifies for a statutory exemption, 
we find no legislative authority to deprive him of that exemption 
because of conduct or activities unrelated to the merits of granting 
or continuing that exemption."273 
Thus, several propositions appeared to have been established in 
Gutknecht, Oestereich, and Eisdorfer. First, regulations that are un-
authorized by and in conflict with the Act clearly are invalid. Sec-
ond, deferments and exemptions are not forfeitable personal 
privileges. Third, one cannot be deprived of a deferment or exemp-
tion because of conduct or matters that do not go to the merits of 
granting or continuing that deferment or exemption. 
Application of these propositions to section 1625.2 builds a 
strong case for holding th.at section of the regulations invalid as ap-
plied to conscientious objectors. The regulation patently conflicts 
with the Act, which provides that "nothing" shall deny a conscien-
tious objector his exemption. Also, it seems somewhat fallacious to 
argue that the regulation is authorized by section IO(b)(l) and can 
thus contradict other provisions of the Act. The delinquency regu-
lations were promulgated under the same statutory grant, but the 
Court nevertheless struck them down as unauthorized by, and in con-
flict with, the Act. The real conclusion gained from Gutknecht would 
seem to be that a regulation which conflicts with the Act falls out-
side the authority of the President, notwithstanding section IO(b)(l). 
However, in Ehlert the Court ignored this conclusion when it up-
held the waiver theory despite the congressional mandate tl1at no 
conscientious objector be subjected to combatant training. Further-
more, it should be noted that the grant of authority found in sec-
tion IO(b)(I) authorizes the President to prescribe rules "to carry 
out the provisions of this title."274 It is clear from section 6G) that 
272. 396 U.S. at 303. 
273. 396 U.S. at 303-04, quoting Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 
U.S. 233, 237 (1968). 
274. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b)(l) (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968). 
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Congress intended to exempt conscientious objectors from military 
service.275 Therefore, any regulation that destroys the right to the 
conscientious objector exemption cannot be said to carry out the 
provisions of the Act and in effect represents only the unauthorized 
assertion of power. Finally, it is submitted that in situations in 
which a registrant with a valid claim may be denied his liberty on 
grounds of a mere technicality, the view expressed in Gutknecht-
that delegated powers will be construed narrowly when the civil 
liberties of citizens are concerned-should be adopted to ensure a 
fair hearing of all claims.276 
Section 1625.2 not only represents the unauthorized assertion of 
power, but it also treats exemptions and deferments as waivable and 
forfeitable. Yet Gutknecht, Eisdorfer, and Oestereich expressly re-
jected such treatment as invalid in establishing the proposition that 
deferments and exemptions cannot be waived or otherwise denied 
by conduct unrelated to the merits of the particular exemption or 
exemptions. Thus, a reasonable application of the principles es-
poused in these recent decisions clearly leads to the conclusion that 
section 1625.2 is invalid as applied to conscientious objectors.277 
The registrant, therefore, should have the right to raise his claim 
at any time before or after his induction order is mailed regardless 
of when his beliefs crystallized. However, in emphasizing the Sys-
tem's need for efficient administration and timeliness, the Court ap-
pears to have dismissed lightly the powerful reasoning found in 
Oestereich, Gutknecht, and Eisdorfer, as well as the apparent con-
gressional preference given to conscientious objectors. 
In addition to departing from precedent, the Supreme Court's 
position in sustaining section 1625.2 violates certain considerations 
of fairness. Section 45I(c) of the Act provides that " ... the obliga-
tions and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve 
components thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with 
a system of selection which is fair and just . . .. "278 It is difficult to 
find any justification in terms of fairness in a regulation that denies 
a registrant the right to have his claim decided on the merits. The 
Selective Service regulations are technical, confusing, and often be-
yond the comprehension of many registrants, many of whom may 
275. See text accompanying note 256 supra. 
276. "Where the liberties of the citizen are involved, we said that 'we will construe 
narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them.'" 396 U.S. at 306-07, citing 
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958). 
277. As far back as the 1950's, several courts seemed to feel that this conclusion was 
warranted. United States v. Underwood, 151 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1955); United 
States v. Crawford, 119 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Cal. 1954); United States v. Clark, 105 F. 
Supp. 613 (W.D. Pa. 1952). 
278. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 45l(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-
1968). 
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be financially unable to hire necessary legal assistance.279 The tech-
nicality of the regulations is further compounded by the totally in-
adequate ability or willingness of the Selective Service System to 
provide more than minimal help in explaining to a registrant ex-
actly what his rights are under the Act and regulations.280 
As mentioned earlier,281 the justification usually given by courts 
for section 1625.2 is that considerations of efficiency and orderly ad-
ministration of the Selective Service System dictate a point beyond 
which claims cannot be raised.282 Thus, only those claims arising out 
of circumstances beyond the registrant's control are presently allowed 
once an induction order is mailed. However, it may be questioned 
whether section 1625.2 is a necessary prerequisite to the efficient and 
orderly administration of the System. Even assuming that an in-
creased number of last-minute claims would result if section 1625.2 
were invalidated, the System has been geared to handle last-minute 
delays and problems. To ensure fulfillment of manpower quotas, 
the local boards consistently order substantially more men to report 
for induction than they actually need.283 The monthly calls could 
be adjusted for an additional number of last-minute claims. This 
is especially true at the present time when the manpower pool con-
sists of far more men than the System can possibly need for induc-
tion.284 In addition, not every registrant will wait until the last 
possible point in time to raise his claim. Unless the registrant is ap-
proaching age twenty-six, the only thing he might gain by frivolous 
279. See, e.g., Comment, The Selective Service System: An Administrative Obstacle 
Course, 54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 2123 (1966); Wright, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 338 (1969). 
280. During a registrant's continuing association with the System, he will find this 
failure to apprise him of his rights and duties continually repeated. The regulations 
impose a presumption that registrants have notice of the requirements of the law and 
the regulations. 32 C.F.R. § 1641.1 (1971). This notice requirement actually extends 
further than the common-law rule that a person is presumed to have knowledge of 
the criminal law since it imposes on a registrant notice of his affirmative duties as 
well. See R. PERKINS, CRII\UNAL LAw 799-809 (1957). Until very recently, the Selective 
Service System made little effort systematically to inform registrants what these affir-
mative duties are. Moreover, the System never made a concerted effort systematically 
to inform registrants of their rights under the Act and the regulations. Editorial 
Note, An Examination of Fairness in Selective Service Procedure, 37 GEo, WASH, L. 
R.Ev. 564, 571-74 (1969). 
281. See note 199 supra and accompanying text. 
282. See, e.g., United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 149 (2d Cir. 1966), afjd. on 
remand, 266 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 959 (1967). 
283. See "Supplement to Health of the Army: Results of the Examination of Youth 
for Military Service, 1968," Medical Statistics Agency, Department of the Army (1969); 
Committee for Legal Research on the Draft, Model Brief: Invalidity of Regulation 
1625.2, at 18 n.24 (1970). 
284. See J. DAVIS & K. DOLBEARE, LnTLE GROUI'S OF NEIGHBORS! THE SELECTIVE SER-
VICE SYSTEM 130-31 (1968). 
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delay will be an additional period of uncertainty and further delay 
in beginning his civilian career.285 
In summary, sound analysis, both in terms of precedent and 
policy, weigh against upholding section 1625.2 in its application to 
conscientious objectors. It is unfair to registrants with valid claims 
who are unable to discover their rights and duties in the maze of 
Selective Service technicalities and regulations. In addition, section 
1625.2 itself, without the guise of authority, conflicts with the very 
law it should further by treating the right to claim a conscientious 
objector status as waivable and forfeitable. In Gutknecht and Oester-
eich, the Supreme Court clearly rejected a waiver theory as applied 
to all deferments and exemptions. The coverage of protection ex-
tended to deferments and exemptions by these cases extends to all 
deferments and exemptions whether they originate within the Act 
itself or are merely authorized by the Act and granted by the regu-
lations. Moreover, even if a waiver theory were appropriate for de-
ferments and exemptions granted by the regulations, it is clearly 
inappropriate as applied to an exemption-e.g., the conscientious 
objector exemption-to which Congress and the courts have given 
a preferred status. In this light, then, it may fairly be said that the 
Court's opinion in Ehlert, which completely ignores these consider-
ations without attempting to reconcile or distinguish them, and in-
stead rests on timeliness and efficiency, is somewhat less than 
satisfactory. 
b. Is Crystallization of a Person's Beliefs as a Conscientious Ob-
jector a "Circumstance" Beyond His Control? Prior to Ehlert the 
courts took two different positions on the issue whether an individ-
ual can control his beliefs as a conscientious objector.286 The two 
285. Exec. Order No. 11563, 35 Fed. Reg. 15435 (1970), modified 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 
to provide, inter alia, that registrants who have reached age twenty-six without receiv-
ing an induction order will be inducted only after all available registrants (except 
those between ages eighteen years-six months and nineteen years) have been inducted. 
Thus, regardless of whether the registrant has used delaying tactics, reaching age 
twenty-six without receiving an induction order will reduce his draft vulnerability 
significantly. A registrant who is subject to the lottery in any year but who reaches 
age twenty-six before the year expires and before he has been issued an induction 
order '1'.ill be placed in a low-priority group. See 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. NEWSLEITER 29 
(1970). 
286. Among those cases holding that crystallization is beyond a registrant's control 
are United States v. Nordlof, 3 SEL. SERv. L. REP. 3546 (7th Cir. 1971); Scott v. Com-
manding Officer, 431 F.2d 1132 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Sandbank, 403 F.2d 38 
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961 (1969); United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 
(2d Cir. 1966), afjd. on remand, 266 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y.), afjd., 379 F.2d 915 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967); Keene v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 
(10th Cir. 1959); Peterson v. Clarke, 289 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1968). Contra, 
Ehlert v. United States, 422 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1970) (en bane), afjd. on other 
grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. April 21, 1971); United States v. Jennison, 402 
F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 912 (1969); United States v. Helm, 
386 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958 (1968); David v. United 
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leading circuit court cases dealing with this issue were the Ninth 
Circuit's opinion in Ehlert v. United States287 and the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in United States v. Gearey.288 In Gearey the Second 
Circuit took the view that a registrant's beliefs may be crystallized 
after he receives his induction order and that this crystallization is 
not within the registrant's control. The court stated, "The realiza-
tion that induction is pending, and that he may soon be asked to 
take another's life, may cause a young man finally to crystallize and 
articulate his once vague sentiments."289 Similarly, the dissenting 
opinion in the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ehlert accepted the view 
that it is not within an individual's control to become a conscien-
tious objector and noted that the opposite view is " ... a disparage-
ment of the concept of conscience most out of tune with the 
prevailing mores of the day. One simply cannot order his conscience 
to be still or make himself believe what he does not believe."290 
A majority of the Ninth Circuit, rejecting the Gearey position, 
concluded that "[p ]resumptively, every human is a rational being, 
having a free will and in complete charge of his thinking,"291 and 
omitted any further consideration of whether a person can control 
his conscience and beliefs. However, in a concurring opinion Judge 
Duniway carried the analysis somewhat further and stated that, re-
gardless of the volitional element, crystallization of conscientious 
objection is not a "circumstance" within the meaning of the regu-
lations. Thus, even if crystallization is beyond the registrant's con-
trol, it is not a circumstance because "circumstance indicates . . . 
some fact, act or event external to the mind or consciousness of the 
registrant, rather than the mysterious and unfathomable internal 
mental and spiritual processes of the registrant himself."292 Judge 
Merrill in his dissenting opinion responded to Judge Duniway's po-
sition quite persuasively: 
A "change in the registrant's status" under the regulation can 
States, 374 F.2d I (5th Cir. 1967) (dictum); United States v. Al-Majied Muhammad, 
364 F.2d 223 (4th Cir. 1966). See also Kulas v. Laird, 315 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), 
in which the court held that the late crystallization of a registrant's claim of con-
scientious objection required reopening even though this involved a late crystalliza-
tion, not of substantive beliefs, but of knowledge of the law. The basis for this 
decision was the fact that the registrant's local board had mistakenly informed him 
that Roman Catholics could not qualify as conscientious objectors and that he had 
not discovered this error until after an induction order had been issued. 
287. 422 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1970) (en bane), affd., 39 U.S.L.W. 4453 (U.S. April 21, 
1971). 
288. 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966), affd. on remand, 266 F. Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y.), 
affd., 379 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967). 
289. 368 F.2d at 150. 
290. 422 F.2d at 339. 
291. 422 F .2d at 334. 
292. 422 F.2d at 335. 
May 1971] Comments 1135 
have reference only to a change in the registrant's right to a partic-
ular classification. "Circumstances" in this context can have refer-
ence only to the conditions relevant to such a change of status. In 
the case of the conscientious objector status the only relevant condi-
tion or circumstance is the registrant's state of mind. The effect of 
the majority's construction is to single out conscientious objector as 
one status entitled to no consideration at this stage of the proceed-
ings.203 
Thus, when Ehlert appealed his conviction to the Supreme 
Court, two issues were presented: (1) Does the crystallization of a 
person's beliefs as a conscientious objector constitute an involuntary 
change in status which section 1625.2 establishes as a post-induction 
order condition precedent to reopening and (2) Even if crystalliza-
tion can properly be said to represent an involuntary process, is it 
a circumstance within the meaning of the regulations? Only if the 
Court answered both of these questions affirmatively would post-in-
duction order reopening of claims maturing after issuance of the 
order have been permissible. For if crystallization were voluntary, 
section 1625.2 would specifically withhold from the local board the 
authorization to reopen. Moreover, even if the ripening of a claim 
of conscientious objection were deemed uncontrollable, the avail-
ability of reopening would depend on a finding that it is the type of 
circumstance envisioned by the regulations. 
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Stewart, noted 
that it was unnecessary to "take sides in the somewhat theological 
debates about the nature of 'control' over one's own conscience 
which the phrasing of this regulation has forced upon so many fed-
eral courts,"294 and thus refused to answer the first issue. Instead, the 
Court agreed with Judge Duniway295 and disposed of the appeal by 
holding that mental changes in status, such as those that occur when 
conscientious objection crystallizes, do not represent the circum-
stances contemplated by section 1625.2. Claiming that the regula-
tion is ambiguous, Justice Stewart held that in the face of such 
ambiguity, the court was obligated to defer to a "reasonable, con-
sistently applied administrative interpretation"296 of the regulation. 
Therefore, since the Government had "consistently urged . . . in 
litigation" that circumstances are limited "to those 'objectively 
identifiable' and 'extraneous' circumstances that are most likely to 
prove manageable without putting undue burdens on the adminis-
293. 422 F.2d at 338. 
294. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455. 
295. See text accompanying note 292 supra. 
296. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Thorpe 
v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969); Immigration &: Naturalization Serv. v. 
Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock &: Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). 
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tration of the Selective Service System,"297 and since this position 
was "wholly rational,"298 the Court accepted the Government's po-
sition. This acceptance thus excluded mental events, such as the con-
version to conscientious objector status, from the definition of 
circumstances. 
However, Justice Stewart did note that "[i]t would be wholly 
arbitrary to deny the late crystallizer a full opportunity to obtain a 
determination on the merits of his claim to exemption from com-
batant training and service just because his conscientious scruples 
took shape during a brief period in legal limbo."299 But since the 
Court was "assured ... by a letter included in the briefs in this case 
from the General Counsel of the Army to the Department of Justice, 
that present practice allows presentation of such claims, and that 
there thus exists no possibility that late crystallizers will find them-
selves without a forum in which to press their claims,''300 it dismissed 
these fears as groundless and decided to allow the military, rather 
than the Selective Service System, to evaluate claims that mature 
subsequent to the issuance of an induction order. Justice Stewart 
thus characterized the decision as merely effecting an "allocation of 
the burden of handling claims."301 
Finally, in response to the argument that section 60) precludes 
the induction of conscientious objectors, Justice Stewart concluded 
that "[t]he only unconditional right conferred by statute upon con-
scientious objectors is exemption from combatant training and ser-
vice. "302 And, since the court was assured that those claiming 
conscientious objection who are inducted do not receive "combatant 
training or service until their claims [have] been acted upon,"303 
induction itself does not present a conflict with the Act. 
The impact of the decision, then, is not to cut off the late crys-
tallizer's claim on the merits, but to change the forum that will 
conduct the evaluation. Furthermore, since the opinion fails to dis-
tinguish between voluntary and involuntary maturation of late-ris-
ing beliefs of conscientious objection, presumably even the registrant 
who controls his beliefs can qualify for a hearing on the merits. 
297. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455. 
298. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455. 
299. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455. 
300. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4456. The Court noted that Army Regulations "are somewhat 
inconsistent in their phrasing" as to whether a claim which matured before induction 
will be heard by the military. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455-56. See Army Regulation No. 635• 
20, ,r 3; Department of Defense Directive No. 1300.6, § IV(B)(2). However, the Court 
accepted the General Counsel's letter as sufficient indication that the claim will be 
evaluated on the merits. 
301. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4454. 
302. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4454. 
303. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4455. 
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The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan,304 joined by Justice 
Marshall, and the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas305 clearly 
illustrate the problems in the majority's reasoning as well as the 
potential impact of the decision on those individuals whose beliefs 
mature after their boards issue induction orders to them. First, 
Justice Brennan argued that the cases cited by the Court in support 
of its deference to an administrative agency when there is "a reason-
able, consistently applied administrative interpretation"306 stand for 
the proposition "that judicial interpretation of an ambiguous regu-
lation is to be informed by reference to administrative practice in 
interpreting and applying a regulation, not by reference to positions 
taken for purpose of litigation."307 After noting that North Carolina 
and California local boards, upon direction from state headquarters, 
have in fact interpreted and actually treated crystallization as a 
proper circumstance within the meaning of section 1625.2, he con-
cluded that administrative practice cannot "properly form the basis 
of decision."308 
As a further argument, Justice Brennan, objecting to the ma-
jority's characterization of the regulation as ambiguous, noted: 
In the context of a blanket Selective Service regulation applicable to 
all claims for deferment and exemption, the reference to "circum-
stances" must be taken to refer to any conditions relevant to eligibil-
ity for a deferment or exemption. Since conscientious objection to 
war is the basis for a deferment, it must constitute a "circumstance" 
within the plain meaning of the regulation.309 
Thus, as Brennan recognized, the conclusion flowing from Ehlert, 
that crystallization of conscientious objector status is not a circum-
stance within the meaning of the regulations, seems to be a some-
what strained interpretation of "circumstance." It is difficult to 
understand why the President-by way of the regulations-would 
attempt to discriminate against conscientious objectors by "singl-
[ing] out conscientious objector status as one status entitled to no 
consideration"310 after the induction order has been issued. Accord-
ing to the Court's view, a reopening to consider a hardship claim 
could be allowed after an induction order had been issued because 
the change in status would be a proper circumstance, whereas a sim-
ilar claim for conscientious objection will not be allowed because a 
304. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4459. 
305. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4456. 
306. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4460. 
307. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4460. 
308. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4460. 
309. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4460. 
310. Ehlert v. United States, 422 F.2d 332, 338 (9th Cir. 1970) (en bane) ijudge 
Menill, dissenting). 
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change in a mental state can not constitute a proper circumstance. 
The result of such an approach, of course, would be gross discrim-
ination against the conscientious objector that Congress certainly 
has not authorized. On the contrary, by embodying the conscien-
tious objector exemption in the Act, Congress has evinced an in-
tent that they have a preferred status.311 Thus, it appears highly 
unlikely that either Congress or the President has ever contemplated 
that the rights or privileges afforded to other classifications be de-
nied to conscientious objectors. Yet, this is precisely the impact of 
Ehlert. Only the registrant whose post-induction order involuntary 
change in status is the crystallization of his beliefs as a conscientious 
objector will have to undergo induction and have his claim reviewed 
by military, not civilian, tribunals. 
Justice Douglas, in his dissent, appeared less concerned with tech-
nical questions of regulatory construction and emphasized the prob-
lems facing the individual who raises a claim of conscientious 
objection after induction. First, he noted and documented the abu-
sive treatment often meted out by the military to those claiming to 
be conscientious objectors. Then he emphasized the practical prob-
lems faced in raising an in-service claim of conscientious objection: 
[P]roof of a conscientious objector's claim will usually be much more 
difficult after induction than before. Military exigencies may take 
him far from his neighborhood, the only place where he can find the 
friends and associates who know him. His chance of having a fair 
hearing are therefore lessened when the hearing on his claim is rele-
gated to in-service procedures.312 
Thus, Justice Douglas reasoned that any ambiguity in the regulation 
be resolved "in favor of the procedure most protective of the rights of 
conscience"313 and that the registrant should not be relegated "to 
the regime where military philosophy, rather than the First Amend-
ment, is supreme."314 
In summary, the Ehlert decision effects a discrimination against 
conscientious objectors whose claims arise after classification and 
thrusts them and their claims into an environment that is often 
hostile to them. The result is somewhat ironic. Of all the registrants 
entitled to exemption and deferment on the basis of a last-minute 
change in status, the only one posed with the dilemma of becoming 
a part of the military establishment and having his claim evaluated 
by the organization is the conscientious objector. Yet, the military 
represents the precise source and heart of his objection. In this 
regard, the Ehlert decision is less than satisfying. 
311. See text accompanying note 256 supra. 
312. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4458. 
313. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4458. 
314. 39 U.S.L.W. at 4458. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Judicial refinements of the regulatory guidelines for reopening 
have played a significant role in ensuring that each registrant re-
ceives a modicum of procedural due process when he raises a claim 
for a new draft classification. However, by themselves, these modifi-
cations may be insufficient to guarantee substantially equal treat-
ment among registrants. Because the classification standards by which 
classification decisions are made appear to be vague at best,815 it can 
be expected that similarly situated registrants will continue to be 
evaluated by varying criteria,816 notwithstanding the presence of pro-
cedural restrictions on the absolute discretion of local boards. While 
it may also be possible for the courts to develop substantive classifi-
cation criteria, as they have indeed done in several cases,817 it ap-
pears that this would merely be an ad hoc approach leading to splits 
among the courts, which would perpetuate and further compound 
the present problems of inequality. Furthermore, it is doubtful that 
judicial standards would be readily discoverable and ascertainable 
by the average registrant and therefore they would fail to serve as 
meaningful guides in the presentation of a claim to the local 
board.818 Thus, the task of formulating substantive, as opposed to 
procedural, guidelines for the Selective Service System classification 
decisions would appear to be most appropriately carried out by con-
gressional action. 
315. See notes 167-72 supra and accompanying text. 
316. For an informative discussion of the discrimination among registrants found 
both within and among local boards, see J. DAVIS &: K. DOLBEARE, LITTLE GROUPS OF 
NEIGHBORS: THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 17 (1968). 
317. See note 154 supra and accompanying text. 
318. See note 167 supra. 
